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Instruments of Accommodation:The Military Chaplaincy and the ConstitutionIra C. Lupu and Robert W. Tuttle1IntroductionOver the past several years, constitutional issues involving the military chaplaincy haveprogressed from a low simmer to a rolling boil.  After decades of little public attention, storiesabout the chaplaincy regularly reach the national news,2 cases seem to proliferate in the courts,3and new scholarly articles on the subject appear regularly.4  The stories and lawsuits cover a wide
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=996050
Fanaticism and the United States Air Force Academy, 8 Rutgers J. L. & Relig. __ (2006); StevenH. Aden, The Navy's Perfect Storm: Has a Military Chaplaincy Forfeited its ConstitutionalLegitimacy by Establishing Denominational Preferences?, 31 W. St. U. L. Rev. 185 (2004);William A. Wildhack, Navy Chaplains at the Crossroads: Navigating the Intersection of FreeSpeech, Free Exercise, Establishment, and Equal Protection, 51 Naval L. Rev. 217 (2005);Emilie Kraft Bindon, Commentary, Entangled Choices: Selecting Chaplains for the United StatesArmed Forces, 56 Ala. L. Rev. 247 (2004). 
5 Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31167 (D.D.C., 4/30/07); Chaplaincy ofFull Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Wilkins v. United States, 2005U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41268 (S.D. Cal., June 29, 2005).
6 Klingenschmitt v. Winter, 1:06-cv-01832-HHK (D.D.C., filed Oct. 25, 2006); KenWalker, USMC Chaplain Who Took a Stand Says Navy Is Retaliating, Baptist Press (Jan. 16,2007), online at: http://www.bpnews.net/bpnews.asp?ID=24777.  
7 William T. Cavanaugh, Jr., Note, The United States Military Chaplaincy Program:Another Seam in the Fabric of our Society?, 59 Notre Dame L. Rev. 181 (1993); ChristopherHitchens, GI Jesus: The Real Problem with Military Chaplains, Slate (Oct. 2, 2006), online at:http://www.slate.com/id/2150801.
8 Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 1304.19, Appointment of Chaplains for theMilitary Departments (June 11, 2004); DoD Instruction 1304.28, Guidance for the Appointmentof Chaplains of the Military Departments (June 11, 2004).
9 Army Regulation 165-1, Religious Activities: Chaplain Activities in the United StatesArmy (March 25, 2004), Chapter 4, Roles and Functions of Chaplains and Chaplain Assistants;2
array of legal questions, from discrimination in the selection and promotion of chaplains,5 toconstraints on the conduct of chaplains’ ministry,6 to the constitutionality of the chaplaincyitself.7  Legal analysis of these issues has thus far proved somewhat problematic, because themilitary chaplaincy occupies a highly unusual position in constitutional law.  Consider the basic structure of the military chaplaincy.  The government establishesprofessional standards for eligible clergy, and decides which chaplains should be hired,promoted, and discharged.8  Chaplains engage in government-funded worship, religiousinstruction, and pastoral counseling.9  Moreover, the government builds the houses of worship in
Air Force Policy Directive 52-1, Chaplain Service (October 2, 2006); Department of the Navy,OPNAV Instruction 1730.1D, Religious Ministry in the Navy (May 6, 2003).
10 See, e.g., Department of the Army Pamphlet 165-18, Religious Activities: ChaplaincyResources Management (January 21, 2000) (Pamphlet “describes how resources such as funds,facilities, manpower, and property are managed, safeguarded, and accounted for”).
11 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
12 Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 232-33 (2nd Cir. 1985).
13 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
14 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
15 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 3
which chaplains conduct religious services, pays for hymnals and liturgical supplies, andprovides the materials for religious instruction.10  These kinds of expenditures and employmentdecisions represent the core features of any definition of an “establishment of religion.”   How,then, is the chaplaincy consistent with the Establishment Clause of the Constitution’s FirstAmendment?To answer that question, courts and commentators generally turn to one or more of thefollowing paradigms:• Establishment Clause history – resting on the Supreme Court’s decision in Marsh v.Chambers,11 which upheld the constitutionality of the Nebraska state legislature’schaplaincy, this paradigm focuses on the long history of the armed services’ chaplaincy asthe foundation for its current legitimacy.12 •  Public funding of religion – drawing from the Court’s decisions from Everson v. Bd. ofEducation13 through Lemon v. Kurtzman14 to Agostini v. Felton15 on government aid forreligious enterprises, this paradigm examines the various tests used by the Court to
16 Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232-33.
17 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
18 Chaplaincy of Full Gospel, 454 F.3d 290, 302.
19 755 F.2d 223, 232-33 (2nd Cir. 1985).4
determine when government support for religious entities crosses a line intoimpermissible promotion of religion.16  • Governmental display of religious messages – looking to the Court’s decisions ongovernment presentation of religious symbols,  most prominently Lynch v. Donnelly,17this paradigm asks whether government-sponsored religious messages reflectunconstitutional “endorsement,” or permitted “acknowledgment,” of religion.18  Although the historical approach to appraising the chaplaincy is useful and relevant, it  isnot fully sufficient to answer the questions raised by the institution of the chaplaincy today.  Andthe paradigms of no-funding and no-endorsement – to the extent they still shape the law –  arisefrom circumstances wholly apart from those which give rise to the chaplaincy and toconstitutional questions about its scope and operation.   An adequate approach for EstablishmentClause analysis of the military chaplaincy requires a different framework, one appropriate tothose circumstances.Part I of this essay describes Katcoff v. Marsh,19 the most important decision on theconstitutionality of the military chaplaincy.  Part II of the essay then turns to our contention that constitutional inquiry into the military chaplaincy should begin from the basic insight,
20 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 n.10 (1963) (discussing militarychaplaincy as justified by religious needs of military personnel), id. at 296-98 (Brennan, J.,concurring) (same), id. at 308-09 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (same); Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d at235-37.
21 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, §702; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (Religiousemployer is exempt from prohibition on religion-based discrimination “with respect to theemployment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carryingon by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities”).  Corp. ofPresiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge toexemption for religious employer from Title VII’s bar on religion-based discrimination inemployment).
22 Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc.
23 RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1.
24 Title VII, § 701, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (l) (definition of religion includes obligation tomake reasonable accommodations for employees’ religious exercise).  See also Trans WorldAirlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977) (upholding requirement of reasonableaccommodations, but construing obligation narrowly); but see Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472U.S. 703 (1985) (holding unconstitutional, on Establishment Clause grounds, Connecticut statutethat required employers to accommodate employees’ need for religious sabbath observance).
25 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding “released time” program, in whichpublic school students are excused from school to attend religious instruction).
26 Zorach, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Corp.of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1(1989); Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); Cutter v. Wilkinson,5
occasionally sometimes recognized by  courts,20 that the military chaplaincy exists for theprimary purpose of accommodating the religious needs of military personnel.  As such, thechaplaincy bears a  family resemblance to other types of religious accommodations, such asexemptions for religious entities from regulation of employment21 or land use 22 protections forreligious exercises of prisoners23 or employees,24 and arrangements for the religious instruction ofpublic school students.25  In a series of decisions over the past six decades,26 the Supreme Court has considered
544 U.S. 709 (2005). 
27 See, e.g,, Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four EstablishmentClauses, 8 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 725 (2006).  Add cite to Gey article in this Symposium6
Establishment Clause challenges to a variety of religious accommodations.  Despite theprevailing general sense of disorder in the universe of Religion Clause jurisprudence,27 theCourt’s accommodation decisions represent  a surprisingly coherent model.  These decisions,taken together, suggest that religious accommodations must satisfy four, linked constitutionalnorms.  First, is the accommodation a reasonable effort to relieve a government-imposed burdenon religious practice?  Second, do beneficiaries of the accommodation participate voluntarily? Third, is the accommodation available on a denominationally-neutral basis?  Fourth, does theaccommodation impose significant material burdens on third parties?In Parts III and IV, we apply those criteria to constitutional challenges affecting themilitary chaplaincy.  Part III deals with constitutional challenges to the chaplaincy as a whole.We suggest that the institution of the chaplaincy itself should survive challenge, althoughspecific practices of the institution have less certain constitutional footings.  We turn to suchparticular challenges in Part IV.   There, we consider the services’ policies for hiring (accession),promotion, and retention of chaplains.  We also examine the services’ regulation of particularaspects of chaplains’ ministry, including the conduct of worship, prayer at official functions, andpastoral care.  Through our examination of each of these facets of the military chaplaincy, weattempt to show how the Establishment Clause standards for religious accommodations shouldguide the relevant inquiry and judgments.  We believe that consistent application of thesestandards will intelligently clarify and wisely resolve the current and heated controversies
28 755 F.2d 223 (2nd Cir. 1985).  See also Israel Drazin and Cecil B. Currey, For God andCountry: The History of a Constitutional Challenge to the Army Chaplaincy (1995).
29 Id. at 237-38.
30 Id. at 236-37.
31 Id. at 237-38.  Before any further hearing on the remand, the plaintiffs abandoned thecase.  See Drazin and Currey, note xx supra, at xx-xx.7
surrounding the military chaplaincy.I. Katcoff v. Marsh: Challenging the ChaplaincyIn 1985, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected the first – and to thisdate only – direct constitutional challenge to the military chaplaincy.  The lawsuit, Katcoff v.Marsh,28 alleged that the military chaplaincy violated the Establishment Clause because auniformed, government-financed chaplaincy was not necessary to meet the religious needs ofservice members.  The district court dismissed the complaint, and the appellate court partlyaffirmed and partly reversed.29  After a thorough review of the history and current operation ofthe military chaplaincy, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that a privately funded civilianchaplaincy could fulfill the military’s requirements for religious services.30  The court thusaffirmed the lower court’s decision that the chaplaincy, considered in its entirety, does not violatethe constitution.  The court remanded the case to the lower court, however, because it concludedthat plaintiffs might be able to show that particular practices of the chaplaincy, such as provisionof religious services at domestic installations that could readily be served by civilian chaplains,might violate the Establishment Clause.31Although the outcome in Katcoff seems correct, the appellate court’s searchingexamination of the details of the military chaplaincy came up shortwhen the court turned to
32 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
33 Id. at 232 (discussing and quoting Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)).
34 Katcoff, at 232 (discussing and quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
35 Katcoff, at 232.
36In this regard, Katcoff was following the Supreme Court’s lead in the then-recentopinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984), which had similarly declared that the Lemonstandards were guideposts, but were not always controlling.  Id. at 66x.
37 Id. at 233. 8
application of the governing law.  The court began its analysis by citing the Supreme Court’sdecision in Marsh v. Chambers,32 which upheld the practice of legislative prayer because of its“unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years.”33  Judge Mansfield’s opinion forthe Second Circuit panel claimed  that the military chaplaincy shared a comparable history.  Thecourt was not entirely persuaded by the historical justification for the chaplaincy, because it thenturned to the Supreme Court’s three-part Establishment Clause test from Lemon v. Kurtzman.34 Under Lemon, a statute must have a secular purpose, must have a primary effect that does notadvance or inhibit religion, and must not excessively entangle government and religion.  Thecourt determined that the military chaplaincy would “fail to meet the Lemon v. Kurtzmanconditions,”35 but the court did not treat this failure as dispositive of the chaplaincy’s fate underthe Establishment Clause.36Instead, the court said that the Establishment Clause concerns reflected in the Lemon testneeded to be balanced in this context against interests arising from two other constitutionalprovisions, the War Power Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.37  The court found in the WarPower Clause a requirement of significant judicial deference to Congress in military affairs:
38 Id. at 234.
39 Id. at 234-35.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 237.
42 Veitch v. England, 471 F.3d 124 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churchesv. England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In Re: England, 375 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert.denied 543 U.S. 1152 (2005); Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31167 (D.D.C.,9
[W]hen a matter provided for by Congress in the exercise of its war power andimplemented by the Army appears reasonably relevant and necessary tofurtherance of our national defense it should be treated as presumptively valid andany doubt as to its constitutionality should be resolved as a matter of judicialcomity in favor of deference to the military’s exercise of discretion.38Moreover, the court found the chaplaincy to be a necessary means of avoiding violationof service members’ rights under the Free Exercise Clause.39  By removing soldiers from theirreligious communities, the court reasoned, the military has interfered with their opportunity toengage in religious activity, and thus might be deemed to have infringed the service members’right to free exercise.40  The chaplaincy provides the means through which Congress hasinsulated the military from liability for such infringements of religious liberty.  Taken together,the court concluded, the concerns reflected in the War Power and Free Exercise Clauses overridemore traditional principles of disestablishment.  Thus, the military chaplaincy is justified as anecessary response in “circumstances where the practice of religion wold otherwise be denied asa practical matter to all or a substantial number.”41Subsequent constitutional challenges to the military chaplaincy have focused primarily onpersonnel issues, in particular the preferences allegedly given to chaplains of certain faith groupsover others for purposes of recruitment, promotion, and retention.42  In deciding these cases,
4/30/07); Adair v. England, 417 F.Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006); Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 346 F.Supp.2d122 (D.D.C. 2004).
43 Chaplaincy of Full Gospel, 454 F.3d 290, 302.
44 Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31167 (D.D.C., 4/30/07).  Judge Urbinapublished his opinion in Larsen within a few weeks after we delivered this paper at theSymposium  We discuss Larsen further in Part II.B.1., below.10
courts have continued the struggle evident in Katcoff to find a coherent methodology forresolving Establishment Clause challenges to the military chaplaincy. These courts have invokedMarsh and the historical precedents for the chaplaincy, the three-part test from Lemon, the freeexercise and war powers arguments from Katcoff, and have also appealed to the Supreme Court’spost-Katcoff decisions on public displays of religion (Lynch v. Donnelly and its progeny).  Forexample, the D.C. Circuit’s ruling in Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England adopts theconcept of governmental “endorsement” of religion, taken from public display cases, as itspreferred standard for Establishment Clause scrutiny of the chaplaincy.43  In a recent andpromising judicial development, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia in Larsen v.U.S. Navy44 relied on a model of accommodation akin to what we propose in ruling that the U.S.Navy did not have to accept chaplain candidates in precise proportion to the Navy’s faithdemographics.Legal commentators have generally taken the same route as pre-Larsen courts inconstitutional assessments of the military chaplaincy.  These commentators typically invokesome mix of the three major strands of Establishment Clause jurisprudence – the historicalapproach in Marsh, the three-part Lemon test, and the “endorsement” standard from the publicdisplay decisions, supplemented by the war powers and free exercise concerns reflected in
45 See Michael J. Benjamin, Justice, Justice Shall You Pursue: Legal Analysis of ReligionIssues in the Army, 1998-NOV Army Law. 1.; Aden, supra note ____, at XXX; Bindon, supranote ____, at XXX; Cavanaugh, supra note ___, at XXX; Wildhack, supra note ___, at XXX.
46 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971) (three-part test for determiningimpermissible governmental involvement with religion); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790-792 (1983) (historically accepted practices withstand Establishment Clause challenges); Lynch v.Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (Establishment Clauseprotects against governmental endorsement of religion); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S.573, 655-679 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part, dissenting in part)(Establishment Clause protects against government-coerced religious exercises); Agostini v.Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 230 (1997) (revision of Lemon test).
47 463 U.S. 783, 790-792 (1983). 11
Katcoff.45  The resulting analysis tends to reveal the underlying uncertainty with respect toapplicable legal standards.  Nearly all commentators accept the judgment in Katcoff that theinstitution survives facial challenge under the Establishment Clause, but their explanation of thatjudgment, and their examination of specific practices of the chaplaincy, are deeply unpersuasivebecause of the difficulty of explaining why any particular standard should be applied in a givencontext.This struggle of courts and commentators is understandable.  The field of EstablishmentClause jurisprudence is littered with tests,46 and the military chaplaincy seems to possesselements drawn from the full range of problems that implicate disestablishment principles.  Whatother arm of government finances religious instruction, erects religious displays, and engages inofficially sponsored prayer and worship?  Nonetheless, the tests appropriate to such contexts,which are most often invoked by courts and commentators in assessments of the militarychaplaincy, are ill-suited to this task.The argument from history, found in Marsh v. Chambers,47 has been applied by the
48 There has been a recent flurry of lower court decisions about prayer in state and locallegislative bodies.  See, e.g., Hinrichs v. Bosma, 440 F.3d 393 (7th Cir. 2006); Simpson v.Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005); Wynne v. Town of GreatFalls, S.C., 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004); Coles v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir.1999); Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 1998).
49 Marsh, 463 U.S. 783, 793-794.
50 Id. at 790 (“Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary violations ofconstitutional guarantees, but there is far more here than simply historical patterns”). 
51 403 U.S. at 612-613.
52 521 U.S. at 230. 12
Supreme Court only to legislative chaplaincies,48 and seems to rest on the specific characteristicsof religious activity in such chaplaincies.  Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that thechallenged invocations were brief and non-sectarian, and conducted in a setting in whichlisteners were free to come and go as they pleased.49   In the absence of such characteristics, theCourt indicated, the historical foundation of the legislative chaplaincy would be insufficient towithstand Establishment Clause scrutiny.50  The military chaplaincy, however, involves muchmore extensive religious activity than the ceremonial practice contemplated in Marsh.  As wediscuss later, military chaplains may be called upon to perform ceremonial functions, in someways akin to legislative prayer, but such functions do not comprise the core of the chaplains’obligations, which involve the provision of specifically religious services.Nor is the three-part test from Lemon51 – or its more recent revision in Agostini v. Felton52– a particularly useful standard for assessing the military chaplaincy.  The questions asked inLemon and Agostini focus on the government’s involvement in religious activity undertaken withgovernment financial assistance.  At first glance, the chaplaincy would seem to fall within this
53 Id. (Establishment Clause analysis of government aid to religion is undertaken in orderto determine “whether any use of that aid to indoctrinate religion could be attributed to theState”).
54   See Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982); Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830(1982).
55 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 844-845, 857-863 (O’Connor, J., concurring in thejudgment) (restating Lemon - Agostini test in context of aid to religious schools).
56 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 13
ambit, because the government does spend money on the chaplaincy.  But the analytic focus ofLemon and Agostini  is quite different.  Through the purpose and effect prongs of the standardsderived from those decisions, courts determine whether the government bears responsibility forthe religious activity of government-supported, private religious organizations.53  Ordinarily,government support does not convert the conduct of a private entity into “state action” forconstitutional purposes.54  Under the Establishment Clause, however, the government may beheld responsible for the religious activities of funded private entities, and the Lemon and Agostinimeasures are intended to determine when such responsibility is fairly assigned to thegovernment.   The Lemon and Agostini tests thus focus on factors peculiarly suited to therelationship between government and private religious institutions, such as the extent ofgovernment-imposed safeguards on religious use of funds, the monitoring of compliance withthose safeguards, and the risks of entanglement between government and religion.55  In contrast,the government funds the military chaplaincy for the specific purpose of delivering religiousservices, so application of the Lemon-Agostini tests seems conceptually misplaced. .The Establishment Clause tests applied in challenges to public displays of religion areequally ill-suited to scrutiny of the military chaplaincy.  From Lynch56 through the Court’s most
57 McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
58 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
59 See, e.g., Lynch, 465 U.S. 668, 677 (citing long list of “illustrations of theGovernment's acknowledgment of our religious heritage and governmental sponsorship ofgraphic manifestations of that heritage”); cf. id. at 697 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (nativity scenerepresents official endorsement rather than acknowledgment of Christianity).
60 As John Hart Ely wrote years ago in a different context, “No answer is what the wrongquestion begets.” John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust xx (Harvard Univ. Press. 1979).
61 Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 223. 14
recent decisions in this context, McCreary County57 and Van Orden,58 the disputes have centeredon the question of whether the display reflects a message of government promotion(“endorsement”) of religion, or mere “acknowledgment” of the historical – i.e., arguably non-religious –  significance of the religious display.59  The religious content of the militarychaplaincy, however, can hardly be deemed a matter of reasonable doubt.  The government erectschapels and pays the salaries of chaplains precisely because of the religious significance of suchplaces and people.  Attempts by courts and commentators to determine whether practices orpolicies of the chaplaincy reflect constitutionally impermissible endorsement of religion are thus doomed to failure.60 The appellate court in Katcoff ultimately appealed to two additional constitutionalprovisions, the grant of War Powers and the Free Exercise Clause, in finding that the militarychaplaincy withstood Establishment Clause challenge.61  Although  reliance on these clauses isunderstandable, neither supports a credible theory of how and why Establishment Clause
62 This failure of explanation is highlighted in a panel member’s partial dissent, objectingto the remand for evaluation of specific practices of the chaplaincy). Id. at 238 (Meskill, J.,concurring and dissenting).
63 See Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 301-304 (D.C. Cir.2006) (Establishment Clause not subject to same balancing tests as other First Amendmentrights, and thus violation is by definition an irreparable injury for purposes of preliminaryinjunctive relief).
64 In Katcoff, the court wrote: “Unless the Army provided a chaplaincy it would deprivethe soldier of his right . . . under the Free Exercise Clause to practice his freely chosen religion.” 755 F.2d at 234.  The court appears to link this obligation with “compulsory” military service,but the draft ended a decade before Katcoff was decided, and the court elsewhere treats theobligation as one owed to all service members, whether volunteers or draftees. 15
interests must give way 62  The argument based on the grant of War Powers fails to recognize anessential characteristic of the Establishment Clause; unlike other provisions of the bill of rights,such as the protections for speech or religious exercise, the Establishment Clause has nottraditionally been treated as subject to a “public necessity” limitation.  In other words, the statemay not successfully respond to an Establishment Clause claim by an appeal to the publicbenefits generated by the challenged religious activity.63With respect to the argument based on the Free Exercise Clause, the court in Katcoffsignificantly overestimated the strength of servicemembers’ free exercise rights.  The courtsuggested that the military would be constitutionally required to provide some form ofchaplaincy, in order to avoid infringing the free exercise rights of soldiers who would beseparated from their places and communities of religious worship.64  Such an overestimate wasunderstandable in 1985, but not today.  In the intervening twenty years, the Court hasdramatically restricted the scope of the constitutional protection for Free Exercise Clause.  The
65 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
66 Id. at XXX.
67 42 U.S.C § 2000bb.  RFRA still applies in full force to the federal government.  TheCourt’s decision in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) held RFRA unconstitutional asapplied to the states, because the Act exceeded the powers of Congress under the 14thAmendment.
68 Gonzalez v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S.Ct. 1211 (2006)(applying RFRA to the federal government).
69 475 U.S. 503 (1986).  In Goldman, the Court refused to require the military toaccommodate an officer’s religious interest in wearing a kippah.  
70  Moreover, the court in Katcoff suggested that service members’ free exercise rightsmight offset possible Establishment Clause violations.  Even if that were so, which we doubt, statutory rights under RFRA are not constitutionally based, and would not therefore have thesame offsetting force.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, xxx (1997) (RFRA exceeds16
Court’s decision in Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith65 refused to extend strict judicialscrutiny to “general rules of neutral applicability” that happen to burden religious exercise.66 Virtually all military regulations that hinder service members’ religious exercise represent such“general rules,” including deployment orders, restrictions on off-base travel, and duty schedules. None of these types of regulations specifically target religious practices for disfavor, but all arecapable of imposing serious obstacles to religious exercise.The Religious Freedom Restoration Act67 may provide servicemembers with some degreeof protection for religious practices.68  The scope of that protection, however, would likely belimited by the Court’s strong deference to military authorities, reflected in the pre-Smith decisionin Goldman v. Weinberger.69  RFRA purports to restore the pre-Smith law, of which Goldmanremains a part, so there is no reason to believe that RFRA protects free exercise rights in themilitary any more than the First Amendment does.70
scope of protection accorded by the Free Exercise Clause).
71 Indeed, the three leading Supreme Court decisions on religious accommodationsappeared in the four years immediately following the appellate court decision in Katcoff.  Estateof Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S.327 (1987); Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
72 The leading secondary commentary on accommodations includes Douglas Laycock,Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original Understanding of theEstablishment Clause, 81 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1793 (2006); Lisa Schultz Bressman,Accommodation and Equal Liberty, 42 William & Mary L. Rev. 1007 (2001); Michael W.McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 Geo.Wash. L. Rev. 685 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion, 1985 Sup. Ct.Rev. 1.  One of the co-authors of this article has taken a generally negative view of religion-specific accommodations, see Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 Geo. Wash. L.Rev. 743 (1992); Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case AgainstDiscretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 555 (1991).  Both of ProfessorLupu’s anti-accommodation articles, however, like Professor Bressman’s article, have criticizedthose accommodations that single out religion for favored treatment.  The military chaplaincydoes not fit that description, because the military similarly responds to the needs of servicemembers for many other kinds of social experiences, including athletics and secular cultural17
The reliance in Katcoff on free exercise interests places the constitutional analysis in theappropriate framework, as does the court’s decision to remand the case for determination of thepractices “reasonably necessary” to meet servicemembers’ religious needs.  What the courtlacked, however, was a model of Establishment Clause  review that more directly addressed theissues raised by a government program that purports to address specific religious needs.  Such amodel does exist, although in 1985 it was far less developed in the Supreme Court’sEstablishment Clause jurisprudence than it is today .71  Over the past six decades, the SupremeCourt has decided a significant number of cases involving Establishment Clause challenges togovernmental “accommodations” of religious practices otherwise burdened by the government. After a brief survey of these decisions, we sketch out the model of Establishment Clause analysisthat they embody.72
experience. 
73 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
74 Id. at 308.
75 Id. at 309-10.
76 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 18
II. The Governing Principles of Religious AccommodationThe concept of accommodation first appears in the Court’s 1952 decision, Zorach v.Clauson,73 which upheld a program of “released time” religious instruction that was operated bythe New York public schools.  On approval from their parents, schoolchildren were releasedfrom public schools in order to receive religious instruction.  The instruction was conducted andfunded by a variety of religious institutions, and offered outside of the schools.  During theperiod for religious instruction, those students whose parents did not consent to religiousinstruction remained in school.  Providers of religious instruction informed the school of anystudent who had been  released into this program, but had failed to report for religiousinstruction.74  Plaintiffs brought an Establishment Clause challenge to the program, arguing that iteffectively made the public schools full partners in the enterprise of religious instruction.75  Theplaintiffs had reason to be optimistic about their claim, because four years earlier, the SupremeCourt had held unconstitutional a similar program.  In McCollum v. Board of Education,76 theSupreme Court had enjoined a program under which teachers of religion, representing a varietyof faiths, came to the public schools for one period each week.  Parents could elect for theirchildren to receive instruction from a specific teacher; those students who were not enrolled in
77 Id. at 207-209.
78 Id. at 210-212.
79 Zorach, 343 U.S. 306.
80 Id. at 311-12, 315.
81 Id. at 313.  At the time, Justice Douglas was considering – not for the first time – a runfor the presidency.   See Bruce Alan Murphy, Wild Bill (___ Press, 200x).19
religious instruction remained at school (but typically were not given alternative instructionduring the period).77  By a vote of 8-1, the Court ruled that the program violated theEstablishment Clause through its conferral of support, both material and otherwise, on religiouseducation.78In Zorach, however, a 6-3 majority rejected the Establishment Clause challenge and upheld the New York released time program.79  The two programs are distinguishable; in theIllinois scheme, the teachers of religion used public school classrooms and were screened byschool personnel, while the New York religion classes took place outside the schools andgenerally involved less school supervision.80  The major difference between the cases is JusticeDouglas’s introduction of the concept of accommodation.  Although the Court’s opinion is bestknown for Douglas’s comment “We are a religious people whose institutions presuppose aSupreme Being,”81 the rest of that paragraph holds a more enduring legacy of the decision.  Wequote at length from the relevant portion of Douglas’s majority opinion:When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religiousauthorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to sectarian needs, it followsthe best of our traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our peopleand accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold that it maynot would be to find in the Constitution a requirement that the government show acallous indifference to religious groups.
82 Zorach, 343 U.S.  at 313-14.
83 Id. at 313.
84 Id. at 311. 20
. . . . In the McCollum case the classrooms were used for religious instructionand the force of the public school was used to promote that instruction. Here, aswe have said, the public schools do no more than accommodate their schedules toa program of outside religious instruction. We follow the McCollum case.  But wecannot expand it to cover the present released time program unless separation ofChurch and State means that public institutions can make no adjustments of theirschedules to accommodate the religious needs of the people.82The concept of accommodation thus grows from a fairly common meaning of the term – to makeroom for something within a schedule.  The schedule, of course, was the public school day, andthe Court’s reasoning started with the basic assertion that schools regularly release individualstudents for religious observances, as requested by their parents.83  The schools should be free todo the same on a larger scale, permitting not just isolated students but any whose parents wishedtheir children to receive such instruction.  By making room in the schedule, the governmentopened an opportunity for individuals to choose to engage in religious activity.84  Thus, thegovernment’s role was responsive to parental need, rather than motivated by the state’s ownagenda in support of religious instruction.  The state acted to facilitate private religiosity, ratherthan to offer religious content of the state’s own devising.  Moreover, the program was formallyopen to all faiths.The Court’s opinion leaves much to be desired.  Not once did the Court address thequestion of why parents need this particular accommodation to provide their children withreligious instruction.  Presumably, the length of the school day did not preclude religious
85 Id. at 320 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
86 Id. at 318 (Black, J., dissenting).  A student enrolled in religious instruction who failedto appear without excuse would be truant, and would be in violation of the state’s compulsoryattendance law. 
87 Id. at 311-12.
88 Id. at 321 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).21
instruction before or after regular classroom hours.  More likely, the problem was that parentsand children were not as likely to make use of their non-school time for religious education.  Indissent, Justice Frankfurter asked why the school day could not simply be shortened, and suchchildren as were willing could attend religious instruction.  He then provided the answer: “Butthat suggestion is rejected upon the ground that if they are made free many students will not go tothe Church.”85  Seen from that perspective, the released time program functions more as a publicstimulus and enforcement mechanism for religious education.86The Court’s opinion also demonstrated a complete lack of interest in the experience ofstudents who do not attend religious instruction during the designated period.  It noted only thatstudents were not “forced” to participate in religious instruction.87  As Frankfurter argued indissent, the school may indeed close its doors during the period of religious instruction, but “theyare closed upon those students who do not attend the religious instruction, in order to keep themwithin the school.”88  The obligation to remain in school, Frankfurter asserted, imposed a burdenon non-participating schoolchildren.  The children faced a choice – they could remain in schoolfor extra work, or at least extra time in “captivity,” or they could agree to participate in religiousinstruction.  This choice, Frankfurter said, demonstrated the extent to which the state had
89 In his dissent, Justice Jackson made essentially the same argument against the releasedtime plan as Frankfurter: because the state releases from “captivity” only those students who arewilling to receive religious instruction, and consequently “imprisons” those who are unwilling toreceive religious instruction, the state has unconstitutionally exercised its coercive powers insupport of religion.  Id. at 323-25.  Professor Lupu’s experience with the program as a child inupstate New York confirms this experience of “imprisonment.”  Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble withAccommodation, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 743, 743-44 (1992).
90 Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 8-15 (history of disestablishment in colonial era and earlyrepublic).  See also id. at 33-42 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (focusing on debates in Virginia overdisestablishment).
91 Zorach, 343 U.S. 306, 312-14.  See also McCollum, 333 U.S. 203, 244-48.
92 Zorach, 313-14.
93 The paradigmatic statement of this “alternative” Establishment Clause history can befound in the dissenting opinion of Justice Rehnquist in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-114(1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 22
established religion through its released time program.89Whether or not the Court correctly decided Zorach, the decision created the seed of theaccommodation concept.  Zorach’s contains within it both the concept’s justification and, asexplicated in the dissenting opinions, the limitations later to be imposed on it.  Pushing backagainst the Everson decision’s embrace of a strongly separationist interpretation of theEstablishment Clause,90 Zorach advanced an alternative history of the Clause that had first beenarticulated in Justice Reed’s McCollum dissent.91  Under this history, the founders’ decision notto establish a national church went hand-in-hand with a general agreement that religion deservesgreat respect in the polity.92 Such respect includes official recognition of the importance ofreligion to the citizenry, made concrete in Thanksgiving proclamations, legislative prayers, andother public ceremonies that include mention of the divine.93  Accommodation of religion played,and continues to play, a central role in this alternative to strict separationism.  Through
94 374 U.S. 203 (1963).  We omit discussion here of McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.420 (1963), in which the Supreme Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to theMaryland Sunday closing laws.  The Court’s decision in McGowan touched on the idea ofaccommodation, but the opinion depended almost entirely on the judgment that the originallyreligious purposes of Sunday closing laws had been transformed into secular grounds for auniform day of rest.   The Court reasoned that the choice of Sunday as the day of rest merelyrecognizes and coordinates the habits of the vast majority of people.
95 Id. at 294-305 (Brennan, J., concurring).
96 Justice Stewart’s dissent develops this argument at some length; he contends that thepractice should be upheld because it permissibly advances the free exercise interest of parents“who affirmatively desire to have their children’s school day open with the reading of passagesfrom the Bible.”  Id. at 312-13 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 223-25. 23
accommodation of religion, the government demonstrates respect for the religious lives of itspeople.In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,94 the Court held unconstitutional thepractice of prayer and devotional Bible reading in public schools.  For our purposes, the case isimportant because Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion offers the first sustained exploration ofthe concept of accommodation.95  Those who defended the practice of prayer and Bible readinghad argued that the practice should be upheld under Zorach as a permissible accommodation  ofthe religious needs of students enrolled in public schools.96  In the majority opinion, written byJustice Clark, the Court focused on the government’s obligation of religious neutrality, which theCourt deemed to have been violated by the Bible reading and prayer.97  Through the schools’ useof the Lord’s Prayer and King James Version of the Bible, the Court held, the government wasintentionally advancing one set of religions over others, and also advancing religion over non-
98 Id. at 224 (noting that the permission to use the “Catholic Douay version” for readingsdid not save the practice from unconstitutionality, because the practice inevitably places thepower of the state behind a particular understanding of religion).
99 Katcoff, 755 F.2d 223, 234-35 (2nd Cir. 1985) (quoting Schempp, 374 U.S. at 296-98(Brennan, J., concurring)).
100 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 294-305 (Brennan, J., concurring).
101 Id. at 298-99 (Brennan, J., concurring).
102 Id. at 297-98 (Brennan, J., concurring).
103 Id. at 298 (Brennan, J., concurring).
104 Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring). 24
religion.98In his concurring opinion, which was quoted at length in Katcoff 99 Justice Brennandirectly confronted the school officials’ defense of the challenged practice as an accommodationof religion.100  Brennan used the military chaplaincy as the paradigmatic form of a permissibleaccommodation, and against that form he contrasted prayer and Bible reading in schools.101  Hisconcurrence noted several features of the military chaplaincy that save it fromunconstitutionality.  First, the chaplaincy responds to a significant burden on service members’free exercise of religion; the source of this burden is their isolation from ordinary opportunitiesfor civilian worship.102  Second, the chaplain’s religious services are provided only to those whoask to receive them, and those who do not seek religious services suffer no penalty for thatdecision.103  Brennan reasoned that the schools’ practice of prayer and Bible reading lacked eitherof those characteristics.  Students attending public schools suffer no material isolation fromordinary opportunities for worship or religious instruction, so the government cannot plausiblyclaim that its religious exercises are designed to alleviate a government-imposed burden.104 
105 Id. at 299-300 (Brennan, J., concurring) (comparing school students to legislators, whoare free to absent themselves from legislative prayer if they so choose, whereas schoolchildren donot enjoy that same freedom to leave without penalty “direct or indirect”).
106 Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring).
107 Between Schemmp and Katcoff, the Court decided Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S.664 (1970).  Walz upheld New York State’s tax exemption for real estate owned and used forreligious purposes by religious organizations.  Although the opinion uses the language ofaccommodation, see 397 U.S. at 673, the exemption applied equally to secular non-profitorganizations, and was not designed to relieve a distinctive burden on religious entities.  TheWalz decision thus plays a relatively insignificant part in the law of permissive accommodation,because the exemption it upheld is neither religion-favoring nor an affirmative provision ofresources to religious entities.
108 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
109 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
110 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
111 489 U.S. 1 (1987). 25
Moreover, the religious experience is provided to all students, not just to those who choose toreceive it.105  Taken together, these features of the challenged religious exercises suggest that theywere intended to further religious purposes of the government rather than to accommodate thereligious needs of schoolchildren.106Although Zorach and Schempp predate Katcoff, the Supreme Court’s most significantdecisions involving religious accommodation did not appear until the two years immediatelyfollowing the Katcoff decision.107  From 1985 to 1987, the Court considered the scope ofgovernment accommodation of religion in four cases: Wallace v. Jaffree,108 Estate of Thornton v.Caldor,109 Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,110 and Texas Monthly v. Bullock.111 Although the four cases involve quite disparate legal contexts, from school prayer to employmentto taxation, each represents an Establishment Clause challenge to a government program that
112 Id. at 40 (quoting Alabama Code § 16--1--20.1 (Supp. 1984)).
113 Id. at 58-60.
114 Id. at 58-61.
115 Id. at 59.
116 Id. 26
purported to relieve a burden imposed on religious activity.In three of the decisions, Wallace, Estate of Thornton, and Texas Monthly, the Courtrejected the government’s claim that the challenged program was a constitutionally permissibleaccommodation of religion.  Wallace involved Alabama’s moment of silence provisions, whichpermitted public school teachers to “announce that a period of silence not to exceed one minutein duration shall be observed for meditation or voluntary prayer, and during any such period noother activities shall be engaged in.”112  A previously enacted Alabama statute also contained amoment of silence provision, which used essentially the same language except that it omitted thereference to voluntary prayer.113  The Court held that the newly enacted provision wasunconstitutional because it lacked a plausible secular purpose.114  The prior moment of silenceprovision fully achieved the state’s expressed purpose of accommodating students’ private,voluntary religious exercise, along with the pedagogical aims of instilling focus and respect inthe classroom.115  Such accommodations, the Court held, must be directed toward, and limited to,the facilitation of private religious activity.116  Seen in that light, the subsequent enactment wassuperfluous, and was properly understood to promote prayer as the state-preferred way to use themoment of silence.In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor further elaborated on the difference between
117 Id. at 67-74 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
118 Id. at 72 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
119 Id. at 73, 76-77 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
120 Id. at 77-79.
121 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
122 Id. at 706 (quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 53--303e(b) (1985)).27
a permissible accommodation and the Alabama statute struck down by the decision.117  Amoment of silence provision, O’Connor said, may withstand constitutional scrutiny because thereligious substance – if any – of the student’s meditation is supplied entirely by the student.118 The government may not specify any particular content of the meditation, or even that the stateprefers the students to use the time for religious meditation.  The shift from facilitation topromotion of religious exercise is determinative.  So long as the state allows the student tochoose whether the moment will be used for religious exercise, and does not steer the studenttoward such exercise, the accommodation satisfies the Establishment Clause.119 . By itssubsequent enactment of the statute that authorized “voluntary prayer,” O’Connor concluded, thestate of Alabama had moved from accommodation to promotion of religion.120In Estate of Thornton v. Caldor,121 the Supreme Court considered an EstablishmentClause challenge to a Connecticut statute that required employers to accommodate theiremployees’ religious desire to observe a Sabbath.  The statute provided that “No person whostates that a particular day of the week is observed as his Sabbath may be required by hisemployer to work on such day. An employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitutegrounds for his dismissal.”122  When Thornton, an employee, refused to work on his Sabbath, he
123 Id. at 706-07.
124 Id. at 707.
125 Id. at 708.
126 Caldor thus resembles TWA, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), in which the Courtupheld the constitutionality of the requirement in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act thatprivate employers reasonably accommodate the religious practices of employees, but construedthe accommodation requirement to demand only de minimis accommodations by employers. Anything more demanding, the Court suggested, would impose an unconstitutionally severe burden on employers to subsidize the religious experiences of their employees.
127 Id. at 708-10. 28
was demoted to a lower position and he then resigned.  Invoking the Connecticut Sabbathaccommodation statute, Thornton sued Caldor, his employer.123  Caldor defended by challengingthe constitutionality of the statute, arguing that the statute had the primary effect of advancingreligion, and thus violated the Establishment Clause.124The Supreme Court agreed with the employer, and held the statute unconstitutional.125Caldor is different from the earlier accommodation cases, because the statute relieved itsbeneficiaries of a burden imposed by private parties rather than by the government.126   Invalidating the statute, the Court focused on the statute’s “absolute and unqualified” grant of anaccommodation to sabbatarians.  The statute disregarded employers’ attempts to make reasonableaccommodations, the economic costs of employers’ compliance, and the burdens suchaccommodations might impose on fellow employees.127  By categorically preferring the religiousexercise of sabbatarians to the interests of employers and fellow employees, the Court said, thestatute crossed the line from permissible accommodation to impermissible government
128 Id. at 710-11.
129 Id. at 711-12 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
130  489 U.S. 1 (1989).  For a recent decision applying the principles of Texas Monthly,see Budlong v. Graham, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 36101 (N.D. Ga, May 16, 2007) (Georgia’s salesand use tax exemptions for Bibles and other specified religious literature violate the Free PressClause of the First Amendment, because they single out religious literature for favoredtreatment.)  This was the ground for Justice White’s concurring opinion in Texas Monthly, 489U.S. at xxx.
131 Id. at 14-16.
132 Id. at 17-19. 29
favoritism for religion.128  A statute that required employers to make reasonableaccommodations, such as Title VII, would not suffer from the same defect, because it simplyrequired employers to take employees’ religious needs into account, alongside other legitimateinterests.129In Texas Monthly v. Bullock,130 the Court held unconstitutional a Texas statute underwhich religious publications were exempted from a sales tax that was otherwise imposed on allpublications.  The Court held that the exemption limited only to religious publications violatedthe Establishment Clause because it lacked a plausible secular purpose.131  The state claimed thatthe exemption was necessary to protect the free exercise interests of religious publications, butthe Court determined that the exemption failed to meet an essential requirement for aconstitutionally permissible accommodation of religion: the accommodation did not relieve anydistinctive burden on religion.132  The sales tax may have added slightly to the price of thereligious materials to be paid by the consumer, and therefore may have reduced sales at themargin.  But imposition of the tax did not make it especially difficult or unlawful to sell the
133 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
134 Id. at 329 & n.1 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, §702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1).
135 Id. at 330-31.
136 Id. at 336-38. 30
literature. Nor did payment of the tax proceeds to the state conflict with the tenets of anyorganization or group that was engaged in such transactions.  Without such a burden ofsignificant lost sales or conflict with religious principles as its foundation, the exemption forreligious publications represented an unconstitutional benefit to religion.In this quartet of accommodation decisions that appeared in the late 1980's, in only onedid the Court uphold the challenged accommodation.133  Corporation of Presiding Bishop v.Amos involved a challenge to the exemption for religious employers, found in Title VII of theCivil Rights Act, from the prohibition on religion-based employment discrimination.134  Anemployee who had been discharged from his position as building engineer of a religious facilityowned by the Mormon Church filed suit against the employer, alleging religious discrimination. He claimed that the complete exemption of religious employers from the ban on religiousdiscrimination violated the Establishment Clause by giving a special benefit to religiousemployers.135  The Court rejected the challenge, and held that the exemption was a permissibleaccommodation of religion.136  Break into new paragraph: In unanimously reaching this conclusion, the Court made twofindings.  First, it determined that the exemption alleviated a distinctive burden on religiousemployers, for whom the restriction on religion-based employment was more likely to affect core
137 Id. at 338.
138 Id. at 336. See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 489 U.S. at 58-60.
139 Amos at 336-37.
140 See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Responseto the Critics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685, 692-93 (1992).
141 The Title VII exemption for religion-based hiring by religious organizations is anequalizer because other, cause-oriented organizations remain entirely free to discriminate in favorof those who subscribe to their cause.  For example, political parties are free to hire only thosewho are politically loyal to the party, feminist organizations may insist that their employees befeminists, and so on.  Similarly, the inclusion of student religious clubs in the class of studentorganizations to which public schools must give “equal access” if the schools permitnoncurricular clubs represents an accommodation for religious clubs equal to that provided theirsecular counterparts.  The Supreme Court upheld the Equal Access Act, which codified thisobligation of public schools, in Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
142 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
143 544 U.S. 709 (2005). 31
aspects of the enterprise than such restrictions imposed on a secular employer.137  Second, theCourt rejected the plaintiffs’ argument – formally similar to the one made in Wallace v. Jaffree –that a prior statutory regime offered a sufficient accommodation for religious employers.138  TheCourt disagreed, and found that Congress had made a reasonable judgment that the prior TitleVII exemption, which included only employees responsible for the employer’s religious message,was administratively and substantively insufficient to alleviate the burden on religiousemployers.139 Whether Amos is viewed as a religion-favoring accommodation,140 or as we prefer,an accommodation that equalizes the position of religious organization with their secular counterparts,141 Amos represents a high-water mark for the law of permissive accommodation.Over the last twenty years, the Court has considered two additional challenges to religiousaccommodations: Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet142 and Cutter v. Wilkinson.143  In
144 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 696.
145  The non-disabled students in the Village attended a private, Hasidic academy.  A priorruling by the Court, Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), at the time made it unconstitutionalfor the state to give the private, religious academy any state aid for the education of disabledchildren.  The Court later overruled Aguilar in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). 
146 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 702-07.
147 Id. at 707-10.  These might have included provision for special education in aneighboring public school district, accomplished in a way that insulated the Satmar Hasidicchildren from ridicule by other children in the neighboring community.
148 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713-14 (2005) (affirming constitutionality ofRLUIPA’s provision concerning the religious exercise of persons confined in governmentinstitutions, 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2); the provision concerning religious land uses was notbefore the Court). 32
Kiryas Joel, the Court held unconstitutional a New York statute that created a special schooldistrict for a village occupied only by members of a particular religious group, the SatmarHasidim.144  The community had requested the state legislature to create such a public schooldistrict, so that its disabled students could get the benefit of state assistance.145  The Courtdetermined that the statute alleviated a distinct burden on the religious practice of the communityby freeing its disabled children from attending school in a nearby community, where they werefrequently ridiculed for their dress and customs, but the statute violated the Establishment Clausebecause the government failed to show that a similar accommodation would have been providedto other religious groups.146  Moreover, the Court found the accommodation unnecessary, assecular alternatives might have alleviated the community’s burden without requiring the creationof the special district.147In its most recent foray into the area of religious accommodations, the Court rejected achallenge to part of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA).148  In its
149 42 U.S.C. §2000-cc-1(a)(1)-(2), quoted in Cutter, 544 U.S. at 712 (“No governmentshall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined toan institution,” unless the burden furthers “a compelling governmental interest,” and does so by“the least restrictive means”).
150 Id. at 713, 717-18.
151 Id. at 713-14.
152 Id. at 720-21.
153 Id. at 725.
154 Id. at 722, 725-26 33
relevant provision, RLUIPA protects the religious exercise of “institutionalized persons,”including prisoners, by requiring the state to afford reasonable accommodations to the sincerereligious practices of such persons.149  The state of Ohio claimed that RLUIPA violated theEstablishment Clause by requiring the state to prefer the religious interests of inmates oversecular interests of others.150  A unanimous Court rejected the state’s claim, and found that thestatute was a permissible accommodation.151  Citing Amos, the Court determined that the statuteresponded to a class of distinct burdens on religion, caused by the state’s incarceration of thoseprotected by the act.152Most importantly, the Court distinguished Ohio’s facial challenge to the statute frompotential as-applied challenges that might be brought in the future.153  The Court ruled thatRLUIPA is capable of being administered constitutionally, but is susceptible to as-appliedchallenge if specific accommodations exceed the scope permitted under the EstablishmentClause.154  The Court said that applications of RLUIPA might violate the Establishment Clause ifsuch accommodations manifested denominational favoritism or imposed significant material
155 Id. at 722-23.
156 Id. at 725-26.
157 Wallace, 472 U.S. 38, 59-60 (1985). See supra TAN XXX-XXX.34
burdens on third parties, whether guards or fellow inmates.155  To ensure that accommodations donot impose such burdens, the Court instructed the lower courts that RLUIPA should beinterpreted with appropriate deference to judgments of prison officials about the safety, security,and welfare of those within the prison environment.156Although the decisions from Zorach to Cutter have arisen in a wide range of contexts, aset of consistent themes emerge from them.  As we elaborate below, the Court has relied on fourcriteria to distinguish permissible from impermissible accommodations:(a) the accommodation must relieve a government-imposed burden on religion, ratherthan impose the government’s own religion-promoting agenda;(b) the accommodation must facilitate private and voluntary religious practice;(c) the accommodation must be available on a denomination-neutral  basis; and(d) the accommodation must not impose significant burdens on third parties.First, the accommodation must relieve a significant government-imposed burden onthe private exercise of religious freedom.  The challenged accommodations in Wallace andTexas Monthly failed to meet this criterion, although they failed in subtly different ways.  InWallace, the Court determined that any conceivable burden imposed on students by thecompulsory school day had been relieved by the previous moment of silence provision, which setaside quiet time that students could use as they chose.157  And in Texas Monthly, the taxexemption did alleviate a financial burden on the sale of religious publications – payment of the
158 Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1989). See supra TAN XXX-XXX.
159 Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 311-13 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See supra TAN XXX-XXX.
160 Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring).
161  Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. 687, 702-08 (1994). See supra TAN XXX-XXX.35
sales tax – but that burden was trivial, and was indistinguishable from the burden the sales taximposed on non-religious publications.158Even if the accommodation responds to a government-imposed burden, however, theaccommodation may still fail to satisfy this first criterion if the response is not reasonablytailored to that burden.  Although the Court has not required a narrow tailoring of relief to theunderlying burden, some reasonable and proportional relationship between the two is required. In Schempp, for example, the school alleged that the practice of prayer and Bible readingaccommodated students who were required to attend school, and thus limited in theiropportunities for receiving religious instruction.159  Although Justice Brennan, in his concurrence,expressed skepticism about the existence of any such burden, he indicated that the purportedaccommodation – government controlled prayer and scripture reading – lacked any reasonableconnection to the alleged burden on students.160  In Kiryas Joel, the Court focused primarily onthe denominational favoritism represented by the accommodation, but it also determined that thestate might have found other, constitutionally preferable ways to alleviate the burden imposed onthe religious community.161 By contrast, in Amos, the Court accorded a measure of deference to Congress in settingthe terms for the accommodation of religious employers under Title VII.  The Court
162 Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1987).
163 Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 72-73 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
164 See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 677-78 (1984) (equating “accommodation”and “acknowledgment” of religion in upholding public display).36
acknowledged that Congress could have – indeed did, at one time – provide a narrowerexemption for such employers, but the present and broader accommodation nonethelessrepresented a reasonable means of alleviating the government-imposed burden on employers,because the narrower exemption had led to incomplete relief from the religious burden ofcomplying with Title VII.162Second, the accommodation must facilitate private and voluntary religiouspractices.  This criterion may seem obvious, but bears illuminating as a core aspect ofaccommodations.  At its most basic level, an accommodation provides an opportunity forvoluntary, private religious exercise.  The government does not specify the content of thatreligious exercise, or even specify that the opportunity created should be used for religiousexercise.  Thus, for example, a moment of silence provision sets aside a time in the school day inwhich students may choose to pray , but the time may equally be used by students to meditate onany topic .  The provision at issue in Wallace failed on this criterion because it attempted tospecify how the moment of silence should be used.163  This criterion is especially important indistinguishing accommodations from other governmental practices involving religion, such aspublic religious displays, which have sometimes been defended as accommodations.164  Suchdisplays are not properly viewed as accommodations, however, because they embody officialrather than private choices of religious content.
165 Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. 702-07.
166 Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response tothe Critics, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 685, 702-05 (1992); Michael W. McConnell, Accommodationof Religion, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 37-39 37
 Third, the accommodation must be available on a denominationally neutral basis. This criterion is related to, and equally fundamental as, the requirement that the religious practiceaccommodated must be private and voluntary.  Through the accommodation, the governmentprovides an opportunity for privately chosen religious practice, but the government does notspecify which religions may avail themselves of the accommodation.  The requirement ofneutrality does not mean that all faiths must find the accommodation equally useful.  Somereligious communities, for example, may want to participate with public schools in a released-time program for religious instruction, like the one upheld by the Court in Zorach, while othersmight elect not to do so.  Some religious prisoners may feel the need to seek accommodationsunder RLUIPA, while the regimen of prison life may not impose such a need on others.  What iscrucial, however, is that the accommodation is actually available for all to use, if needed.  InKiryas Joel, the Court struck down the accommodation because it found that the state legislaturewas highly unlikely to have made a similar accommodation for other religious communities thatmight find themselves similarly burdened.165Fourth, the accommodation must not impose significant burdens on third parties.  Insome respects, the basis for this criterion is the least obvious, although it dominated the Court’srulings in both Estate of Thornton and Cutter.  In his scholarly work on accommodation, Judge(then-Professor) Michael McConnell suggested that the limit on third-party burdens relatesprimarily to concerns about religious favoritism.166  An accommodation that systematically
167 .  McConnell, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 703.
168 Id.
169 Id.; Estate of Thornton, 472 U.S. 703, 709-10.
170 Zorach, 343 U.S. 306, 320-21 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  See also id. at 323-24(Jackson, J., dissenting); McConnell, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev., at 705 (if schools do not providesecular options for students who do not want to use released time for religious instruction, thestate may be creating an incentive to students to participate in religious instruction).
171 See Diana Henriques, Religion Trumps Regulation as Legal Exemptions Grow, NewYork Times, Oct. 8, 2006, at A1 (describing Alabama system of regulating day care centers) 38
alleviates burdens on the religious, and imposes a disproportionate cost of that accommodationon third parties, McConnell argued, grants the protected religious exercise an improperprivilege.167  The Court’s decision in Estate of Thornton, which McConnell describes as asituation in which “the burden on the nonbeneficiaries is disproportionate to the effect on thebeliever,168 provides a good example of this concern about favoring religion.169  Moreover,  in some contexts, the imposition of burdens on third parties may pressuresuch parties to participate in the accommodated religious activity.  This concern animated JusticeFrankfurter’s dissent in Zorach, in which he argued that the “captivity” of non-participatingchildren created public pressure on those children to engage in the religious instruction.170 The strength of this criterion is uncertain, because it has been applied in relatively fewdecisions.  Nonetheless, it could have dramatic consequences for certain accommodations.  Forexample, the State of Alabama exempts religious day care providers from state licensingrequirements,171 thus creating a significant competitive disadvantage for secular day care centersthat must satisfy these requirements.   And the land use portions of RLUIPA, which accord
172 RLUIPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc.  See Elsinore Christian Center v. City of LakeElsinore, U.S. Ct. of App. 9th Cir., Case No. 04-55320 (Decided Aug. 22, 2006) (unpublishedopinion) (upholding constitutionality of Section 2 of RLUIPA).
173 DOD Instructions 1304.19, Appointment of Chaplains for the Military Departments(June 11, 2004); 1304.28, Guidance for the Appointment of Chaplains for the MilitaryDepartments (June 11, 2004); 1300.17, Accommodation of Religious Practices Within theMilitary Services (February 3, 1988). 39
significant protections to religious properties from zoning and other property regulations,172 mayin some circumstances result in the imposition of substantial burdens on the interests ofneighboring owners and users of land.Within the boundaries of these four criteria, the government has considerable discretionwith respect to permissive accommodations of religion.  In Part II below, we analyze the militarychaplaincy in light of this paradigm of religious accommodation.III. The Military Chaplaincy as AccommodationIn this part, we begin by describing the legally salient features of the military chaplaincy. We then apply the Establishment Clause criteria for religious accommodations to the chaplaincyas a whole.  The “military chaplaincy” actually consists of three distinct institutions: the ChaplainsCorps of the Army, the Chaplains Corps of the Navy, and the Air Force Chaplains Service. (Navy chaplains also serve the Marine Corps and Coast Guard.)  The regulations and practices ofthe three institutions differ to some degree, owing at least in part to the differing missions of theservices.  But all three receive their basic legal and operational form through directives from theDepartment of Defense, which implement the statutory authorization for the chaplaincies.173These directives include two core requirements for the service chaplaincies, which are
174 Air Force Policy Directive 52-1, Chaplain Service, § 3.4.2 (October 2, 2006) (hereaftercited as AFPD 52-1); Army Regulation 165-1, Chaplain Activities in the United States Army, §4-4 (March 25, 2004) (hereafter cited as AR 165-1); SECNAV Instruction 1730.7B, ReligiousMinistry Support Within the Department of the Navy, at § 4(a) (October 12, 2000) (hereaftercited as SECNAVINST 1730.7B); OPNAV Instruction 1730.1D, Religious Ministry in the Navy,§ 5.b.(2) (May 6, 2003) (hereafter OPNAVINST 1730.1D).
175 DoD Directive 1304.19, supra note **, at § 4; AFPD 52-1, supra note **, at § 3.4.1;AR 165-1, supra note **, at § 4.5; OPNAVINST 1730.1D, supra note **, at § 5.b.(1).
176 DoD Instruction 1304.28, supra note **, at §§ 6.1-6.4.
177 Id. at § 6.1.1. 40
reflected in the general structure of the chaplaincies and also in the particular tasks assigned toindividual chaplains.  First, chaplains are commissioned to provide religious services inaccordance with the tenets of the religious community that endorsed them for the chaplaincy.174Second, of equal significance, they also provide commanders with advice and assistance inmeeting the religious needs of all those for whom the commander has responsibility, regardlessof religious affiliations.175  These two requirements – the particularism of a chaplain’s ministrywithin a specific faith group, and the pluralism demanded by the obligation to assist all in need –are evident in the service of each chaplain, and provide the basic framework for understandingthe chaplaincy.In order to be eligible for service as a chaplain, candidates must meet minimumeducational qualifications (including a graduate degree), experience in religious ministry, andendorsement by a DOD-approved religious organization.176  The endorsement certifies that thecandidate is recognized by that faith group as “fully qualified” –i.e., ordained, or its functionalequivalent – for professional ministry within that faith group.177  Both the endorsing religiousorganization and the candidate must understand and accept the chaplain’s role within the
178 Id. at § 6.1.3.  See also DoD Directive 1304.19, supra note **, at § 4.2.
179 DoD Instruction 1304.28, supra note **, at § 6.5.
180 See, AR 165-1, supra note **, at § 4-4; OPNAVINST 1730.1D, supra note **, at §§5.b.(2)-(5).
181 See AR 165-1, supra note **, at § 4-3.  OPNAVINST 1730.1D, supra note **, at §5.e.(11). 41
“pluralistic environment” of the military, which includes the obligation to facilitate the freeexercise of all who are served by the chaplaincy.178  If a religious organization subsequentlywithdraws its endorsement for a chaplain, that chaplain ceases to be eligible for continuedservice, and must seek another endorsing organization, transfer to another (non-chaplain)position within the military, or leave the military altogether.179Chaplains serve as commissioned officers.  As noted earlier, their primary obligations areto  provide religious support, including worship and pastoral care, to eligible personnel; and toprovide advice and assistance to commanders on religious and related matters, includingassistance in facilitating the religious exercise of all personnel.  Chaplains may also be assigned anumber of other tasks, including supervision of other chaplains and religious facilities,counseling of individuals and families, instruction in “the moral and ethical quality ofleadership,” and participation in official ceremonies, among other responsibilities.180  Chaplainsare specifically forbidden by the services – and indeed by the Geneva Convention – to engage ina range of other acts and responsibilities, which would directly involve them as combatants or inthe exercise of military command, such as service in courts martial.181  The services providesignificant and ongoing training for chaplains in a variety of areas, ranging from the basicexpectations of military service to more advanced study of clinical pastoral care, military ethics,
182 See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note **, §§ 8-6, 10-1 - 10-4 (chaplain training programs). See generally Department of the Army, Pamphlet 165-3, Religious Activities: Chaplain TrainingStrategy (Sept. 1, 1988).  See also Department of the Army, Pamphlet 165-17, ReligiousActivities: Chaplain Personnel Management, §§ 4-1 - 4-13 (May 11, 1998) (hereafter AR 165-17).
183 See AR 165-17, supra note **, at §§ 7-1 - 7-7.
184 See AR 165-17, supra note **-**, at §§ 6-2 - 6-13, 7-7.  See also Chaplaincy of FullGospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290, 293-94 (DC Cir. 2006) (describing Navy policy ofpromotion and retention of chaplains). 42
and comparative religions.182  Chaplains are eligible for promotion, and as they increase in rank,the balance of their duties tends to shift away from the direct provision of religious services andtoward greater administrative responsibilities within the chaplaincy.183  Upon reaching a specifiedage or time in grade without promotion, chaplains are required to resign or retire from theservice, though such a requirement may be waived in special circumstances.184As we noted earlier, the military has faced no direct and comprehensive EstablishmentClause challenge to the chaplaincy since the Katcoff decision, and the result of any such lawsuitis highly unlikely to be any different now or in the foreseeable future.  Nonetheless, the legaljustification for the chaplaincy should be made clearer, not least because the constitutionality ofspecific practices within the chaplaincy will depend in large measure on the underlying legaljustification for the institution as a whole.   Consideration of the four criteria for theconstitutionality of religious accommodations, unpacked at the end of Part I, above, facilitates theeffort to better understand and defend the institution of the chaplaincy.Criterion 1: does the chaplaincy relieve a government-imposed burden on religiousexercise?  The court in Katcoff recognized that the legitimacy of the military chaplaincy rests on
185 Katcoff, 755 F.2d 223, 234-35 (2nd Cir. 1985).
186 Id. at 235-37.  The isolation is caused both by remoteness and also by the requirementsof military order and security, which prevents civilians from having ready access to soldiers indeployment.  Id. at 236.
187 Id. at 238.
188 Hutcheson, The Churches and the Chaplaincy, 33-41 (Rev. ed. 1997).  See generally,U.S. Army, Welcome to the Army Family: A First Guide for Army Spouses and FamilyMembers, available online at:http://www.gordon.army.mil/ACS/New_Spouse_Guide__Final_.pdf.43
its response to the religious needs of servicemembers.185  The court focused exclusively on oneaspect of the religious burden on servicemembers – isolation from their home religiouscommunities when deployed overseas or to remote domestic postings.186  If such isolation is thesole burden to which the chaplaincy responds, then the appellate court in Katcoff was correct inremanding the case for  review of the scope of the chaplaincy.187  Even allowing for anappropriate degree of deference to the military, the ministry of chaplains in many domesticsettings would be rendered constitutionally vulnerable if isolation of service members were itssole justificationA richer understanding of the religious burden on service members, however, wouldprovide a firmer constitutional footing for the chaplaincy, as well as a more accurate picture ofthe chaplaincy’s significance. This burden of military service has two related dimensions.  First,the military – unlike virtually all other professions – constitutes a distinct community, providingeven in domestic bases virtually all facets of ordinary life, from housing, schools, and healthcareto shopping, recreation, and entertainment.188  The exclusion of organized religion from thatcommunity would deprive service members and their families of the ordinary opportunity
189 Robert J. Phillips, The Military Chaplaincy of the 21st Century: Cui Bono? (ISME-JSCOPE papers). [CITE - other general citations on chaplaincy]
190 The closest analogy on this point would be the chaplains of police and firedepartments, who fill a similar role in those trauma-filled professions.  See, e.g., Malyon v.Pierce County, 131 Wn.2d 779; 935 P.2d 1272 (1997) (chaplaincy program in sheriff’sdepartment did not violate Establishment Clause); Voswinkel v. City of Charlotte, 495 F.Supp.588 (W.D.N.C. 1980) (police department chaplaincy violated Establishment Clause).44
enjoyed by civilians to have a religious experience that is integrated into their normal life.  Themilitary chaplaincy responds to that burden by offering service members and their families theopportunity to participate in religious experience that is integrated with their broader militarycommunal life.  In this sense, the chaplaincy is an equalizer, giving religious experience the samepresence in a military community as other, secular aspects of life.Second, the military presents service members with a range of stresses and otherexperiences that are unique, especially those related to participation in combat, which hasbecome an ever-present reality for service members on active duty and in the reserves.  Thesestresses may have significant effects on service members’ religious beliefs, as well as theirunderstandings of self and relationships with others.189  Such stresses, and the predictable moral,spiritual, and emotional reactions that follow, constitute a real burden on servicemembers, andthe government is constitutionally permitted to design a chaplaincy that responds to such aburden.  An adequate response to that burden will include chaplains who understand and sharethe military experience of those to whom they minister.190Taken together, these two dimensions of the religious burden of military service suggest abroader latitude for accommodation than found in the Katcoff analysis.  The latitude remainsbounded, because not every facet of the chaplaincy is likely to be reasonably characterized as a
191 Indeed, the military provides more traditional religious accommodations in the form ofexemptions from general regulations.  See DoD Directive 1300.17, Accommodation of ReligiousPractices Within the Military Services §§ 3.2.1, 3.2.6, 3.2.7 (February 3, 1988) (establishingpolicy on religious exemptions from work schedules and uniform requirements).45
response to these burdens.  But the Katcoff challenge questioned the validity of the institution asa whole, and questioned whether the existence of a professional military chaplaincy, fullyintegrated into the life of units and the broader military community, represented a reasonableresponse to burdens imposed on servicemembers’ free exercise.  The richer account of suchburdens suggests that the institution may fairly be described as responsive.Criterion 2: does the accommodation facilitate private and voluntary religious practice? This criterion highlights an important difference between the military chaplaincy and most otheraccommodations of religion.  Other accommodations create opportunities for private religiousexperience by relieving beneficiaries of specific burdens, such as a work schedule that interferedwith Sabbath observance, or a ban on wearing certain apparel that might be religiously mandatedfor some people.191  As such, the accommodations typically work in the negative, by removingobstacles.  In stark contrast,  the military chaplaincy is a thoroughly positive accommodation. The military may permit service members free time for religious experience, but the chaplaincycreates the content of such experiences, through preaching, worship, religious instruction, andpastoral care.  Accommodations that serve only to create time or physical space for religiousobservance readily meet the requirement that such exercises must be private and voluntary,because the entity making the accommodation is detached from the religious experience itself.To meet its obligations under this second criterion, the military must show that thereligious experiences provided by chaplains are responsive to the expressed religious preferences
192 Hutcheson, supra note **, at 71-74; Phillips, supra note **, at XXX.
193 See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note **, at § 3-2.a. (“Participation of Army personnel inreligious services is strictly voluntary”).
194 [CITE]
195 See Department of the Army Pamphlet 165-16, Moral Leadership/Values Stages of theFamily Life Cycle § 1-2 (October 30, 1987) (hereafter AR 165-16) (“Chaplain instructors have aresponsibility to avoid any action which would tend to confuse this training with religiousinstruction”). 46
of service members.  Such a showing may be more difficult, or at least more complicated, than itappears, because the chaplaincy – like any institution – operates from its own inertia and theinclinations and competences of its service providers, and not entirely from the articulateddesires of its “customers.”  Moreover, the chaplaincy certainly plays a role in creating a demandfor its services, and also in shaping which services are demanded.  For example, a chaplain whosocializes with troops may invite service members to religious activities led by that chaplain.192 The military responds to this issue by providing that participation in all religious activities mustbe voluntary.193  Commanders at all levels are required to ensure that service members are notsubjected to official pressure to attend religious services or otherwise engage in religiousactivity.194  Chaplains that provide non-religious services, such as training in leadership andethics, are prohibited from using such opportunities to engage in religious instruction, or even tourge service members to participate in religious activities.195The military’s emphasis on voluntary participation by service members in religiousactivities conforms to the requirement that accommodations must respond to private religiousneeds.  This conformity is even more evident in the military’s consistent message that the firstduty of a chaplain is to facilitate the free religious exercise of those who come within the
196 DoD Directive 1304.19, supra note **, at § 4.1.
197 Id. at § 4.2.
198 Hutcheson, supra note **, at 82-83. See also Anne C. Loveland, AmericanEvangelicals and the U.S. Military 1942-1993, at 296-322 (1996).
199 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-78, Religious Support to Force XXI: U.S. Army ChaplainUnit Ministry Teams 3-1a(1) (September, 1997).47
chaplain’s sphere of responsibility. 196 The actual performance of religious services is asubordinated obligation for the chaplain, one that arises in response to particular needs.197The military chaplaincy is not uniformly responsive, however.  It retains elements thatseem more to reflect government promotion, rather than accommodation, of religion.  In part,this lack of uniformity may simply reflect an incomplete transformation of a culture within thechaplaincy, toward one that is consistently focused on accommodation.198  For example, adocument from the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which describes theArmy’s vision for chaplaincy within “Force XXI” – the 21st century Army – offers the followingaccount of the chaplain’s role:The Chaplaincy provides for the free exercise of religion for soldiers, their familymembers, and authorized civilians in a single seamless system.  The UMT [unitministry team] provides comprehensive RS [religious support] and presents thepower of God in the lives of soldiers, families, and authorized civilians.199[break into new paragraph] The document continues with similar substantive, theologicalclaims about the role of the chaplain.  “The UMT represents the comfort and hope of religion andtruth in the high stress environment of military operations and frequent deployments. . . . . Ourstrength as an Army mirrors the very soul of the nation.  The Chaplaincy adds the dimension of a
200 Id, at 3-1b, 3-2a.
201 AFI 52-101, supra note **, at § 2.1. 48
loving and caring God to the environment in which soldiers and Army families live and serve.”200 It is easy, of course, to exaggerate the significance of such statements, especially in a documentthat is now a decade old.  Nonetheless, the sentiments conveyed in the TRADOC paper reflect animportant, if subtle, tension with the vision of the military chaplaincy as an instrument ofreligious accommodation.  Those sentiments profess, in the official words of the Army, specifictheological commitments – that God exists, is powerful, and cares for and loves people.  Suchofficial religious professions cannot be justified through the model of religious accommodationsoutlined above.The Air Force makes a similar claim in a document that is more recent and moreauthoritative than the TRADOC paper.  Air Force Instruction 52-1 describes chaplains as “visiblereminders of the Holy,”201 although it immediately links that description with chaplains’ duty tofacilitate the free exercise of religion by servicemembers.  Compared to substantive religiousclaims found in the TRADOC paper, in which God is asserted to be powerful and loving, the AirForce Instruction suggests only a link between chaplains and “the Holy.”  Nonetheless, the linkrepresents a departure – if only the most innocuous – from the military’s responsive role, inwhich the military provides chaplains who receive their religious endorsements from specificreligious communities.  Instead, the Air Force assertion appears to warrant the religious authorityof chaplains, and indeed to warrant the reality of divine presence.  Neither warrant is consistentwith the Establishment Clause limits on the practice of accommodation.A different challenge to the chaplaincy’s responsive role arises from the question of
202 This question was raised most recently, and most publicly, in the controversysurrounding religious conduct at the Air Force Academy.  See generally Cook, supra note **;Report of Americans United for Separation of Church and State on Religious Coercion andEndorsement of Religion at the United States Air Force Academy, online at:http://www.au.org/pdf/050428AirForceReport.pdf; Laurie Goodstein, Religious-Bias Inquiry isSet at Air Force Academy, New York Times A29 (May 5, 2005); Laurie Goodstein, Air ForceChaplain Tells of Academy Proselytizing, New York Times A16 (May 12, 2005). We do notaddress the equally – although differently – complicated question of proselytizing by servicemembers, but focus here exclusively on such conduct by chaplains.  We also defer for now thenarrower question of a chaplain’s conduct of pastoral care, which we take up later as a distinctpractice of the chaplaincy.  See [section to be added later if/when additional information isreceived from the Armed Forces Chaplains Board]
203 The Air Force Chaplain School briefly distributed to its students a code of ethics forchaplains that was produced by the National Conference on Ministry to the Armed Forces(NCMAF), an interfaith association that includes most of the religious bodies that endorsechaplains for the armed services.  The NCMAF ethics code states: “I will not proselytize fromother religious bodies, but I retain the right to evangelize those who are not affiliated.”  NCMAF,Covenant and Code of Ethics for Chaplains of the Armed Forces, available online at: http://www.ncmaf.org/policies/codeofethics.htm.  The Air Force stopped distributing the code,and said that the code was not an official statement of Air Force policy. Alan Cooperman, AirForce Withdraws Paper for Chaplains: Document Permitted Proselytizing, Washington Post A3(Oct. 11, 2005).
204 [CITE - UCMJ?]
205 See, e.g., AR 165-16, supra note **, at § 1-2.49
proselytizing by chaplains, a question left implicit in our earlier example of the chaplain whoinvites service members to participate in religious activities.202    The issue arises within avacuum of regulation, and even of official guidance, covering the chaplain’s engagement withservice members.203  Some types and situations of proselytizing are clearly prohibited, such asthose that involve harassment or assertions of official authority (although chaplains do not exertcommand authority, they are commissioned officers, and are as such entitled to officialrespect).204  Chaplains are also forbidden to use their conduct of official non-religious services,such as morale support or leadership education, as an opportunity for proselytizing.205  Apart
50
from such restrictions, chaplains may argue that proselytizing is an essential part of theirministry, and – as long as performed in a non-coercive manner – is fully consistent with servicemembers’ rights of free exercise.Because existing regulations neither prohibit nor expressly permit such proselytizing bychaplains, two essential questions about the constitutionality of the practice need to be answered. First, does the Establishment Clause require the government to prohibit non-coerciveproselytizing by chaplains?  Second, does the Free Exercise Clause (or perhaps RFRA) grant tochaplains the right to engage in proselytizing?  The two questions are interdependent,  because anaffirmative answer to either one would likely requirea negative answer to the other.With respect to the Establishment Clause, the answer would turn on the extent to whichsuch proselytizing might reasonably be attributed to the government, acting through its agent thechaplain.  Chaplains are entitled to, and indeed required to, conduct worship services inaccordance with the dictates of their faith.  The religious content of the worship services fitswithin the justification provided for a religious accommodation, because service members chooseto participate.  But where such choice is not present – or, the chaplain might say, not yet present –that justification is far less compelling.  At best, the government could argue that proselytizingrepresents nothing more than a chaplain informing service members of religious opportunitiesavailable to them.  This description is, of course, greatly weakened to the extent that the chaplainsuggests only one such opportunity, or at least the theological efficacy of only one suchopportunity.What, then, of the chaplain’s free exercise claim to engage in proselytizing?  This interestis significantly weaker than the government’s potential Establishment Clause liability for
206 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
207 DoD Instruction 1304.28, supra note **, at § 6.1.3.
208 The question of unlawful discrimination in DoD approval of endorsing organizationsis suggested by a recent dispute over a Wiccan chaplain.  See Alan Cooperman, For Gods andCountry: The Army Chaplain Who Wanted to Switch to Wicca? Transfer Denied, WashingtonPost C1 (Feb. 19, 2007). 51
proselytizing by chaplains.  To begin with, the chaplain’s asserted right would be judged under the standard reflected in Goldman v. Weinberger,206 which suggested extraordinary deference tomilitary authority when service members assert free exercise claims.  There is simply no reasonto treat chaplains differently from other service members for purposes of applying the teachingsof Goldman.  Indeed, the chaplain entered the military subject to an explicit understanding thatthe chaplaincy “function[s] in a pluralistic environment,” and is committed “to support directlyand indirectly the free exercise of religion by all” who are authorized to receive services.207  Acourt would accord quite significant deference to a judgment by the military that proselytizingmay cause tension and divisiveness within the ranks, and may interfere with the chaplain’sprimary obligation to facilitate the free religious exercise of service members.Criterion 3: is the accommodation available on a denomination-neutral  basis?  Comparedto the second criterion, analysis of the third is relatively straightforward.  The chaplaincy isformally open to authorized clergy of all faiths, subject to the requirement of having a DoD-approved endorsing organization.208  Chaplains are required to facilitate all service members’ freeexercise of religion.  This includes direct services by military chaplains; arrangements withcivilian religious leaders or lay leaders if military chaplains are not able to meet the needs ofparticular faith groups; and supportive services coordinated by chaplains, including provision of
209 AFI 52-101, supra note **, at § 3.2; AR 165-1, supra note **, at §§ 4-5, 5-5;OPNAVINST 1730.1D, supra note **, at § 5.b.(2).
210 In Part __, below, we discuss the related and heavily litigated question of religiouspreferences in the selection, promotion, and retention of chaplains.
211 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 722-25 (2005).
212 DoD Directive 1300.17, Accommodation of Religious Practices Within the MilitaryServices (October 17, 1988) (implementing the statutory reaction to Goldman v. Weinberger).52
space or materials needed for religious activities.209  Although it is certainly possible, and perhapslikely, that challenges will be brought because of the military’s failure to make adequateaccommodations for a particular faith group, nothing in the overall structure of the chaplaincysuggests that the institution is designed to promote certain faiths.210Criterion 4: does the accommodation impose significant burdens on third parties?  At firstglance, assessment of this criterion would appear to proceed along the same lines taken by theSupreme Court in Cutter, in its scrutiny of the RLUIPA accommodation.211  Just as the Court inCutter suggested deference to prison authorities with respect to the costs of prisonaccommodation, courts are likely to trust the military to protect the welfare of service membersfrom exposure to serious burdens that might result from the accommodation.  But the analogy toprison accommodations quickly breaks down, because the chaplaincy and RLUIPA’s protectionsfor “institutionalized persons” represent different forms of accommodation.  The harms resultingfrom the chaplaincy might not be the same ones attaching to RLUIPA accommodations, whichfind their direct parallel in the military’s standard rules on accommodation of individual religiouspractices.212  The burdens of conventional accommodation of religious practice by service members
213 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
214 See, e.g., AR 165-1, supra note **, at § 3-2a (“Participation of Army personnel inreligious services is strictly voluntary. However, Army personnel may be required to providelogistic support before, during, or after worship services or religious programs”).53
might include, for example, increased obligations to perform certain kinds of tasks because afellow unit member has a religious reason for not performing them.  There is no reason to believethat the military has categorically preferred the accommodation of religious beliefs to otherrelevant considerations, such as familial needs, nor is there any reason to believe that a mission-oriented military would permit accommodations that generated third-party burdens greatlydisproportionate to benefits bestowed on the beneficiaries of those accommodations. Accordingly, concerns present in Estate of Thornton213 are not likely to arise in the militarycontext.Instead, the burdens at issue in evaluating the chaplaincy would be those that result fromthe affirmative operation of the chaplaincy itself.  To the extent that the chaplaincy functions asan optional feature of military life, the burdens on third parties – non-participants – are likely tobe no more than minor.214  If, however, the military tolerates or approves of more assertiveinteractions between chaplains and service members, especially in contexts of particularvulnerability for the service members, then the harms might be seen as more substantial.  As in the case of RLUIPA’s required accommodations, upheld in Cutter against facialattack, of religious practices in prison, the structure of the military chaplaincy does not suggestany systematic burdens on third parties.  Assertions of unconstitutional burdens on third partiesmust be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, rather than with respect to the institution as a whole.Analyzed in light of its overall structure, the institution of the military chaplaincy is
215 Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006); In Re:England, 375 F.3d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 2004), cert. denied 543 U.S. 1152 (2005); Larsen v. U.S.Navy, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31167 (D.D.C., 4/30/07); Adair v. England, 417 F.Supp.2d 1(D.D.C. 2006); Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 346 F.Supp.2d 122 (D.D.C. 2004).  See also Wilkins v.U.S.A., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 41268.  See generally, Ducoat, supra note **; Aden, supra note**, Wildhack, supra note **.
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readily defensible as an accommodation of religion.   The military chaplaincy is capable of beingconducted in a constitutional manner, even if particular practices might be vulnerable tochallenge.  In what follows, we explore several such practices, and analyze the circumstances inwhich the organization and operation of the chaplaincy might transgress constitutional limits.IV. Accommodations in practiceIn this Part, we address two contexts within the military chaplaincy in which significantconstitutional issues have been raised.  We first consider the services' policies for accession,promotion, and retention of chaplains.  We then examine the services' regulation of particularaspects of chaplains' ministry, including the conduct of worship and prayer at official functions. IV.1. Employment of chaplainsFor more than a decade, a series of lawsuits in the federal courts of the District ofColumbia has addressed allegations of religious preferences in the employment of Navychaplains.215  Although the lawsuits involve a variety of claims, most focus on an alleged policyof the Navy to apportion slots within the Chaplains Corps based on religious affiliation, withone-third each going to Roman Catholics, “liturgical Protestants,” and “non-liturgicalChristians,” with a small portion left for “Special Worship” (i.e., all other faith groups).216  Suchan apportionment, the lawsuits allege, is impermissible because it results in the significant over-
217 Id. at 295-96.
218 Adair v. England, 183 F. Supp. 2d 31, 46-50 (D.D.C. 2002) (discussing Larson v.Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982)).
219 CITE [services’ personnel guidelines; Chaplain career trajectory]55
representation of Roman Catholics and “liturgical Protestants,” and under-representation of thoseclassified as “non-liturgical Christians,” a group that includes most evangelical Christians.  Thisdiscrimination, the lawsuits allege, pervades the personnel policies of the Navy Chaplains Corps,from accession and promotion through retention.217Chaplaincy personnel policies must function within a complex constitutional, statutory,and regulatory matrix.  On the one hand, explicitly religion-based employment policies areordinarily treated as constitutionally suspect, typically requiring strict scrutiny when a matter ofofficial policy.218  On the other hand, the justification for a military chaplaincy rests on the abilityof chaplains to provide specific religious services to the military, so the military is presumablynot indifferent to the religious identity of chaplains.  Reconciling these two considerations – thedefault prohibition on religion-based employment discrimination, and the religion-consciousneeds of the military chaplaincy – represents a constitutional challenge. One key to reconciliation appears in the standard trajectory of a military chaplain’s career. In the lower ranks, chaplains are more involved in the direct provision of religious services, andproportionately less involved in administrative or other duties.  As they progress up through theranks, the proportions shift, and more senior chaplains tend to lack direct responsibility forprovision of religious services.219  Promotions thus should arguably be religion-neutral, becausethey should be used to evaluate and reward the chaplain’s performance of the broader, essentially
220 Larsen v. U.S. Navy, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31167 (D.D.C., 4/30/07).
221 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31167 (D.D.C., 4/30/07).
222 Id. at xxx.
223 Id. at xxx. 56
secular role of facilitating the free exercise of those within the chaplain’s responsibility. At the time of accession, the religious identity of a chaplain is most likely to be relevantto the military’s needs.  Nevertheless, as revealed by recent litigation over accession to thechaplaincy,220 recruitment of new chaplains is likely to be guided by a complex, service-specificcalculus regarding the need to accommodate the religious exercise of service members.  In Larsen v. U.S. Navy,221 the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia recentlyruled in favor of the Navy in a case involving claims of religious discrimination in accession to aposition as Navy chaplain.  The plaintiffs included three Protestant ministers, who hadcomplained that the Navy unlawfully favored “liturgical” Protestant ministers over “non-liturgical” Protestant ministers like themselves.  “Non-liturgical” Protestant ministers are fromdenominations that do not use a formal liturgy or order of worship, and generally perform adultbaptism rather than infant baptism.When the case began several years ago, the plaintiffs alleged that the Navy followed apolicy of accession described by the plaintiffs as a “Thirds” policy.222  Under the “Thirds” policy,according to the complaint, the Navy made efforts to have one-third of its chaplains be  RomanCatholic, one-third be liturgical Protestants, and the last third be non-liturgical Protestants or“Special Worship,” which included all other faiths.223  This division into thirds roughly matchedthe demography of the U.S. in the 1980's.  The complaint alleged, however, that the religious
224 Id. at *29-*31.  Had the Navy openly maintained the sort of denominational preferencereflected in the “Thirds” policy, the question of the legitimacy of such a preference would havebeen squarely presented.  The plaintiffs had argued, citing Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 2228(1982), that courts must strictly scrutinize any such explicit denominational preference.  Whetherthe desire to match the religious demography of the chaplaincy with the religious demography ofthe Navy itself would have satisfied such a strict standard of review is difficult to say.  Once thedemography of the navy changes in the direction of non-liturgical Protestants, there was noremaining justification for the “Thirds” beyond an illicit effort to maintain the existingdistribution of power and authority in the Navy chaplaincy core.
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composition of the Navy had become considerably different from that suggested by the “Thirds.”Thus, over time, the “Thirds” policy had resulted in substantial over-representation of liturgicalProtestants and substantial under-representation of non-liturgical Protestants.The Navy did not admit that it had ever utilized the “Thirds” policy.   Even if it had onceutilized that policy, however, the district court found that it had abandoned the policy, and anychallenge to it was now moot.224  Instead, by the time the case came to be heard on cross-motionsfor summary judgment, the Navy had switched to a denomination-neutral system for accession ofchaplains.  As the district court described the current policy, the Navy no longer tries “to link thecomposition of the Navy Chaplaincy to the religious denominational demographics of thecommunity generally.”225  Instead, the Navy now considers a variety of factors in determining itschaplaincy accession needs, including:226“the breadth of locations where Navy personnel serve,” “the unique circumstancesof Naval service, which involves personnel isolated on ships sailing all over theworld,” “the various functions and tasks of chaplain officers outside of religiousservices including assistance to those of other faith groups and even no faithgroups,” “the need to keep accession, promotion, and retention in line with othernaval communities,” “the need to prevent shortages of qualified clergy,” “the needto maintain capacity to respond to events requiring quick access to chaplains from
227 Id. at 48-49.
228 Larsen, at *42 ((“the plaintiffs own data shows that under the Navy’s current accessionpolicy, accession rates among applicants of different faith groups have ‘converged,’ and anypreviously existing statistical differences “have dissipated.”) (citations omitted).58
different faith groups not stationed on site, such as terror attacks,” and “the needto consider administrative necessities in managing an all-volunteer corps.”In light of the Navy’s explicit move away from denominational consciousness in selectingchaplains, the plaintiffs in Larsen shifted their theory of the case.  Instead of arguing that theNavy was engaging in unconstitutional sectarian discrimination against non-liturgical Protestants, they argued that the Navy was constitutionally obligated to take religious denomination ofapplicants into account, because that was the only way that the chaplaincy could be appropriatelytailored to the free exercise needs of Navy personnel.227  To put the point slightly differently, theplaintiffs argued that the chaplaincy should be denominationally proportionate to the religiousdemography of the Navy – if the Navy as a whole was, for example, composed of one-half non-liturgical Protestants, the Navy chaplaincy should be similarly constituted.The district court rejected this claim.  First, Judge Urbina concluded that strict scrutinywas not the appropriate standard of review for the plaintiffs’ claim of religious discriminationagainst non-liturgical Protestant ministers.  Instead, the court concluded that the plaintiffs had notdemonstrated such discrimination under the Navy’s current system for accession to thechaplaincy.228  The court further rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the only justification for thechaplaincy was the satisfaction of Navy personnel’s constitutional rights of free exercise, and thatsatisfaction of those rights required the Navy to tailor the population of the chaplaincy to the
229 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
230 Id. at *52 (citing Arlin Adams, The Doctrine of Accommodation in the Jurisprudenceof the Religion Clauses, 37 DePaul L. Rev. 317 (1988).
231 Id. at *63.  The court offered the example of Muslims, who represent less than .0027of Navy personnel.  This would lead to only 2 Muslim chaplains in the entire Navy; instead, theNavy seeks to have at least 10 Muslim chaplains, “to ensure a chaplain of this tradition in everymajor geographical area.”  Id. at *64. 59
religious demography of the Navy.  Relying heavily on Goldman v. Weinberger,229 Judge Urbinaexplicitly adopted the model of permissive accommodation:230If, as is the case here, the Navy is permitted, but not constitutionally required, toaccommodate religious needs of its members via a chaplaincy program, the Navy'sprogram need not satisfy every single service members' free exercise need, butneed only promote free exercise through its chaplaincy program. The program isconstitutionally sound if it simply works toward accommodating those religiousneeds.Applying this concept of accommodation, coupled with Goldman-type deference tomilitary judgment, the district court ruled that the current structure of accession to the Navychaplaincy is consistent with the Constitution.  The concept of permissive accommodationincludes a zone of discretion, within which the government may decide how best to reconcilepotentially conflicting objectives.  The Navy’s current approach was both acceptable, andpreferable to the plaintiffs’ suggestion of demographic proportionality, for several reasons.  First,a policy of strict proportionality would inevitably mean that small religious minorities wouldhave “no access to clergy of their faith.”231  Second, a policy of strict proportionality does notadequately respond to worship variations among faiths and individuals; some groups andindividuals require intense and frequent interaction with worship experience, while others
232 Id. at *64-*65.
233 Id. at *65.
234 Id. at *67 (citation omitted).
235 Id. at *68.  See also id. at *55 ((“the Navy’s arguments convince the Court in their ownright that stationing a chaplain wherever a service member needs one would be a logisticalnightmare the execution of which would significantly and perpetually strain military resources.”)
60
typcically make do with much less engagement with religion and its representatives.232  Third, insome  instances, “clergy from one religious denomination are unable to cater to the religiousneeds of a service member from a different religious denomination.”233  In contrast, other clergyare able to cross denominational lines more easily.  The Navy’s accession policy, the court found, permits the flexibility to cope with theseexigencies.  The Navy must “consider units or installations, rather than individuals or broadstatistical representation, as the primary criterion in being able to serve the cumulative total ofindividual requirements most effectively.”234  Once more invoking deference under Goldman, the court concluded that perfect tailoring of the chaplaincy to the free exercise needs ofindividual Navy personnel is probably impossible to achieve, and is not constitutionallyrequired.235The Larsen opinion is a bit of a funhouse mirror.  The case did not involve a conventional Establishment Clause challenge to the chaplaincy of the sort litigated in Katcoff.  Instead, the Larsen plaintiffs wanted to participate in a chaplaincy, but they wanted it shaped in a way thatwould make it easier for non-liturgical Protestant ministers to gain accession.  Judge Urbina quitecorrectly perceived the problem; the plaintiffs wanted him to order the Navy to remake its
236 Id. at *66 (noting the potential entanglement problems associated with the plaintiffs’preferred method of accession).
237 An appeal in Larsen is no doubt forthcoming.61
accession policy in the image they preferred.  To do so would be to hold that there was only oneconstitutionally correct way to structure accession – that is, in line with the religious demographyof the Navy.  As Judge Urbina noted, if he were to order such a restructuring, the Navy wouldinevitably become deeply, and perhaps unconstitutionally, involved in studying “the religioushabits and interests of its service members.”236At the most basic level, Judge Urbina’s opinion proceeds from the sound insight that themilitary chaplaincy is a matter of permissive, not mandatory, accommodation of religious need. No free exercise rights, of either chaplains or other service members, are at stake in its structure. Instead, the constitution gives bounded discretion to all branches of the armed forces to fill thepersonnel  needs of the chaplaincy in ways that optimize the match between considerations ofreligious experience and other considerations of military efficiency.  Whether or not the alleged“Thirds” policy fell with those boundaries, Judge Urbina’s decision to uphold the Navy’s currentpolicy against denominational preference, and against a concept of religious proportionality inaccession, seems constitutionally appropriate.237IV.2. Conduct of ministrySeveral aspects of chaplains’ ministry have also come under constitutional – and, in onecase, quite public – scrutiny in recent years.  We discuss two?/three in this section: the conduct offaith group worship, and prayer at official ceremonies, [and the exercise of pastoral care.]IV.2.a.  Faith group worship
238 10 U.S.C. § 3547(a) (Army); 10 U.S.C § 6031(a) (Navy). 
239 10 USC § 6031(a) (Navy).  See also AFI 52-101, supra note **, at § 3.2.2.1; AR 165-1, supra note **, at § 4.4.e. 62
Worship, for most faiths, is the heart of religious experience; it is the center and sourcefrom which other obligations and practices radiate.  Appropriately , the United States Code givesthe same shape to the military chaplaincy.  Regulations of the Department of Defense and theindividual services specify a wide range of duties for chaplains, but the statutes command onlytwo acts.  Chaplains must hold worship services, and must conduct burial services.238 The obligation to hold worship, however, concerns the type of activity required, not thecontent of that activity.  The military allows chaplains to determine the substance of worshipservices, including liturgy, hymns, and sermons.  In delegating this responsibility to chaplains,the military responds to two potential concerns.  First, the military assures chaplains and theirendorsing bodies that chaplains will be free to lead worship “according to the manner and formsof the church of which [the chaplain] is a member.”239  If chaplains control the content of worshipservices that they lead, they will be able to avoid participation in worship practices that areinconsistent with the demands of their particular religious traditions.  Second, the delegationreflects the dual “commission” of chaplains.  Although the military commissions chaplains toserve as staff officers, who are responsible for facilitating service members’ free exercise, themilitary does not give chaplains the authority to perform religious rites such as administration ofsacraments or conferral of blessings.  That authority comes solely from the chaplain’s religiousbody, and the chaplain acts in the name of that body, not in the name of the military, when
240 Hutcheson, supra note **, at XXX; Phillips, supra note **, at XXX.
241 Office of the Chief of Chaplains Form 13, “Statement of Understanding of ReligiousPluralism in the U.S. Army.”
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leading worship.240This delegation of responsibility for worship could create tension with the underlyingjustification for the chaplaincy, because the particular religious commitments of chaplains mightconflict with the military’s broader goal of accommodating service members’ free exercise ofreligion.  Two such conflicts over worship have arisen in recent years, the first involving theconcept of pluralism, and the second involving the practice of “collective Protestant worship.”PluralismRegulations and guidelines of each of the armed services require chaplains and endorsingbodies to recognize that the ministry of chaplains takes place in a context of religious pluralism. For example, Army chaplain candidates are required to endorse the following statement:While remaining faithful to my denominational beliefs and practices, I understandthat, as a chaplain, I must be sensitive to religious pluralism and will provide forthe free exercise of religion by military personnel, their families, and otherauthorized personnel served by the Army.241This injunction to “sensitivity” provides little guidance on how chaplains should relate theirindividual faith commitments, which might include beliefs about the exclusive efficacy of theirfaith, to the religious beliefs of others, which the chaplain might believe to be erroneous or evensinful. The question of pluralism became concrete in a recent lawsuit, Veitch v. England,242which involved a former chaplain’s claim of religious discrimination.  The lawsuit was brought
243 Id. at 125-27.
244 Veitch v. England, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, *6-*9 (D. DC) (affirmed, Veitch v.England, 471 F.3d 124 (DC Cir. 2006). [On sola scriptura, CITE Oxford Dictionary of theChristian Church]
245 Id. at *8.
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by Rev. Veitch, an ordained minister in the Reformed Episcopal Church, who had served as achaplain in the Navy.  Veitch alleged that his supervisor, Chaplain (Capt.) Buchmiller, who was aRoman Catholic priest, was hostile to conservative and evangelical Protestants.243  In particular,Veitch claimed that Buchmiller criticized the content of his sermons, and especially Veitch’spreaching of “sola scriptura” – a doctrine of the supremacy of scripture to all other sources ofdivine authority and guidance.244  Buchmiller said that his criticisms were directed towardVeitch’s denigration of other chaplains, including alleged references to them as “unregenerate,”rather than to Veitch’s doctrinal preaching.  Buchmiller told Veitch “not ‘to imply that everyoneelse is wrong,’ or that ‘you are the only source of the truth with implications that our otherchaplains have no valid theology.’”245 After a series of increasingly contentious exchanges, Veitch filed an employmentdiscrimination complaint.  The investigating officer found that Veitch had “engaged in non-pluralistic activity as evidenced by his sermons and his statements to the inquiry officer.”  Theofficer’s report gave the following definition of pluralism:Pluralism is a well--established doctrine encompassing both ethical . . .administrative . . . and practical standards . . . in the USN Chaplain Corps. Thebasic tenant [sic?]of pluralism has a long history in the Chaplain Corps. . . . Inlaymen's terms the Navy Chaplain must minister to all faiths in such a manner tobe inclusive . . . to all and unoffensive . . . to all Navy personnel.246
247 Id. at *19.
248 Id. at *1-*2.  See also Aden, supra note **, at 225-229 (2004).
249 Id. at *26-*53; Veitch, 471 F.3d at 127-32.65
Based on the investigating officer’s report, the Navy dismissed Veitch’s claim.  Whenrelations between Veitch and Buchmiller deteriorated further, the Navy relieved Veitch of hispastoral duties and charged him with insubordination.  Among other things, the chargingofficer’s report stated that Veitch was “removed from the pulpit for failure to preach pluralismamong religions.”247  Veitch resigned his commission in the Navy before his court martial on thecharges, although he later tried (unsuccessfully) to revoke his resignation.In his lawsuit, Veitch alleged that his resignation had been coerced through violations ofthe Establishment, Free Exercise, and Speech Clauses of the Constitution, as well as theReligious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) and other statutory protections.  At bottom, Veitchargued that the “pluralism” enforced by his Navy superiors represented an unconstitutional“establishment of religion,” and that the Navy’s sanctions against him for failing to comply withthis official orthodoxy violated his rights to practice his religious beliefs “according to themanner and forms” of the religious body that endorsed his ministry.248  The district court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit avoided what theyacknowledged to be a difficult set of constitutional questions by finding that Veitch lackedstanding to bring the lawsuit.  The courts determined that the Navy did not coerce Veitch’sresignation, and therefore he had suffered no personal injury from the Navy’s policy on religiouspluralism.249The court in Veitch may have avoided the difficult constitutional questions, but the issues
250 Id. at *19.
251 The free exercise problems would implicate speech clause concerns as well.66
are likely to return.  From the facts in the case, the Navy’s policy of religious pluralism can beassigned a range of possible meanings, each with slightly different constitutional implications. We describe the outer boundaries of this range as “maximal” and “minimal” pluralism.Maximal pluralism.  This most robust understanding of pluralism seems to be reflected inthe charging officer’s finding that Veitch “was removed for failure to preach pluralism amongreligions.”250  Although the officer did not elaborate on the duty to “preach pluralism amongreligions,” it might be taken as a theological truth claim, asserting the equal validity of all faithcommitments.  This truth claim of maximal pluralism could be a subtle form of universalism,such as that captured by the sentiment that “we are all on different paths with the samedestination.” Alternatively, maximal pluralism might rest on a more relativistic assertion that allfaith traditions rest on equally unverifiable, subjectivist beliefs.  In both its universalist orrelativist modes, however, maximal pluralism represents a substantive and highly contested set ofreligious commitments.Officially compelled proclamation of these religious commitments would raise seriousproblems under both the Establishment and the Free Exercise Clause.251  The establishmentquestions return us to the framework of accommodation, which provides the warrant forgovernment-sponsored religious activity.  Viewed in that light, the chief issue raised by theconcept of maximal pluralism is whether the affirmative obligation to preach a specific religiousmessage responds to a government-imposed burden on free exercise.  The identity of any suchburden escapes our imagination.  Instead, the Navy’s purported duty to “preach pluralism” would
252 Madison’s Memorial & Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,  330 U.S. 1 (1947), specificallycriticizes any government policy which makes “the Civil Magistrate . . . a competent Judge ofReligious truth,” because such a policy “is an arrogant pretension falsified by the contradictoryopinions of Rulers in all ages, and throughout the world . . ..”  Id. at 67.  
253 Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in OurConstitutional Order, 47 Vill. L. Rev. 37, 83-84 (2002).
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likely arise from just the sort of problem underlying the Veitch lawsuit – religious conflict amongchaplains and service members, exacerbated by inflammatory preaching.  The mandate ofpreaching pluralism, then, would turn the religious message into an instrument of military policy. While the goal may be laudable, the intentional, governmental promotion of specific religiousmessages to further policy goals violates a core component of the non-establishment guarantee. In promoting specific religious doctrines, the government has essentially proclaimed itselfcompetent to judge the religious superiority of such doctrines.252   Regardless of the secularefficacy of the doctrines, this course of action is a violation of government’s constitutionalobligation of neutrality among religions, as well as its jurisdictional limitation to temporalmatters.253An affirmative duty to “preach pluralism” would also be seriously vulnerable to freeexercise or free speech challenges by chaplains.  The strength of these claims, however, dependson a closer examination of the peculiar role held by military chaplains.  Apart from that role, theFirst Amendment would undoubtedly prohibit the government from requiring religious leaders toprofess a specific doctrine.254  In addition to the establishment clause objections discussed above,the requirement would also constitute “compelled speech,” which is tested against a very strict
255 See generally Larry Alexander, Compelled Speech, 23 Const. Commentary 147(2006).
256 547 U.S. ___; 2006 U.S. LEXIS 4341 (2006).68
constitutional standard. 255  To justify such compulsion, the government must show that itsspeech requirement is the least restrictive means of achieving a compelling governmentalinterest.  While the avoidance of interreligious conflict within military units might well beconsidered a compelling government interest, especially in light of courts’ traditional deferenceto military judgments in such matters, the mandatory preaching of religious pluralism is unlikelyto be accepted as the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.  Military officials havemany other and less intrusive means of addressing religious conflict short of mandatingproclamation of specific religious messages.  Unless all those means were shown to beunavailing, courts would be very unlikely to uphold the practice.The religious speech of military chaplains, however, is not identical to the religiousspeech of private persons, because chaplains conduct worship in the course of their officialmilitary duties.  In Garcetti v. Ceballos,256 the Supreme Court recently held that a governmentemployee does not enjoy First Amendment protections when the speech in question is directlyjob-related.  Garcetti suggests that the speech of chaplains, even in worship, is expression by thegovernment rather than private expression.  If that view holds, the problem of compelled speechdisappears; whatever the authority of government to compel private parties to speak, the FirstAmendment is no bar to the government ordering its own agents to deliver particular messages. Even if Garcetti undermines the free speech objection to compelling chaplains to preach amessage of religious pluralism, however, chaplains have other potential objections to such
257 AR 165-1, supra note **, at § 4.4.e.
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compulsion.  First, the government assures chaplains and their endorsing agencies that, in thewords of the Army regulation, “[c]haplains will not be required to take part in worship whensuch participation is at variance with the tenets of their faith.”257  If a chaplain’s religiouscommitments conflict with proclamation of the message of robust religious pluralism, themilitary would seem bound to respect its original promise – although that might result only in thechaplain’s excused absence from preaching or leading worship.Second, and more importantly, preaching in faith group worship is fundamentallydifferent than ordinary acts of government employees’ job-related speech because of the religiouscontent of the worship.  One district court decision, Rigdon v. Perry,258 takes a broad view of thisdistinction between the speech of chaplains and that of other government employees.  In Rigdon,military chaplains challenged a ruling that prohibited them from urging chapel parishioners tolobby members of Congress about pending antiabortion legislation.  The court held that thereligious speech of chaplains, delivered to congregants, does not represent the use of officialauthority to engage in partisan political authority, because in that context chaplains do not speakin any “official” capacity.259  Using the same standard that would be applied to content-basedregulation of private speech, the court ruled that the restrictions at issue were not the leastrestrictive means of advancing a compelling governmental interest, and invalidated the restrictiveruling. Despite the broad wording of Rigdon, the decision does not stand for the proposition that
260 Indeed, in Veitch, the D.C. Circuit panel expressly questioned Rigdon’s conclusion. Veitch, 475 F.3d at 130 (distinguishing “Rigdon,” even if correctly decided (which we doubt)”).
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the speech of chaplains in faith group worship is equivalent, for purposes of constitutionalanalysis, to private religious speech.260  Instead, the decision interprets specific restrictions on thecontent of official speech, and finds that the policies underlying the restrictions do not apply tothe religious speech of chaplains in the context of faith group worship.  The policies at issueinvolved concerns about undue influence by military superiors, and the public perception of apoliticized military.261  The court ruled that chaplains do not exercise military commandauthority, and thus do not present the risk of undue influence that justified the regulation.262  Thecourt also dismissed the military’s concerns about the political involvement of chaplains, findingthat the services regularly tolerate more robust political expression than the chaplains’ conduct atissue in the case.A chaplain’s speech in faith group worship, then, falls in a unique netherworld between  agovernment employee’s job-related speech (restrictable under Garcetti) and the expression of aprivate individual (protected against compulsion by Wooley and Barnette).  As such, the militarymay well have a degree of latitude in restricting the content of chaplains’ religious speech – evenin faith group worship – but the restrictions will need to relate specifically to the chaplain’sgovernment-sponsored role.  In other words, the chaplain acts as an agent of the government evenin the course of faith group worship, but the agency relationship is limited to the purpose of
263 Contrast with Rigdon, in which court suggests that speech of chaplain in worshipshould be characterized as private speech within limited public forum.  Id. at 162-65.71
accommodating service members’ free exercise of religion.263  If the chaplain’s religious speechundermines or otherwise departs from that purpose, the military should be able to take remedialaction, without needing to satisfy the strict scrutiny applied in Wooley or even Rigdon.Seen in light of that modified speech inquiry, the requirement to “preach religiouspluralism” represents a closer case than the restrictions on political activity in Rigdon v. Perry. Chaplains may not exercise the type of command that invites concerns about undue influence,but chaplains are responsible for facilitating all service members’ access to religious experience,and the military may appropriately conclude that such responsibility requires an attitude of equalrespect for all faiths, manifest in all of the chaplain’s activities. Whether or not a chaplain’s statutory or constitutional rights preclude the military fromordering him or her to lead worship in a particular, pluralistic way, we think that theEstablishment Clause forbids the proclamation of an official theology of the armed forces,whether it be Christianity, religious pluralism, or a crude claim that God supports the militarypolicies of the United States.  If we are correct about this, courts would not have to reach thequestions of a chaplain’s rights under any other source to enjoin the imposition of a duty topreach such an official theology.  Minimal pluralism. If the context of preaching in faith group worship represents themaximal claim of required pluralism, the minimal claim involves what might better be called anattitude of “pragmatic pluralism,” manifest in aspects of the chaplain’s role outside of faith groupworship.  Unlike the maximal version, the minimal obligation does not require affirmative assent
264 DoD Instruction 1304.28, supra note **, at § 6.1.3.72
to or expression of theological truth claims.  Instead, the minimal obligation focuses on thechaplain’s performance of specific acts, such as the maintenance of working relationships withfellow chaplains, and the chaplain’s diligence in facilitating all service members’ religious needson an equal basis.  This minimal or pragmatic understanding of pluralism was also manifest inVeitch v. England, because the military alleged that Veitch denigrated other chaplains and otherfaiths even outside of faith group worship, and failed to cooperate in projects of shared ministry.In stark contrast to the constitutional vulnerability of maximal pluralism, the pragmaticversion rests on a solid constitutional foundation.  As noted earlier, chaplains and their endorsingbodies affirm that military chaplaincy takes place in a religiously pluralistic environment, andthat chaplains are expected to respect and further the free exercise interests of all servicemembers, without regard to specific religious commitments.264  A chaplain that denigrates otherfaiths and undermines the ministry of fellow chaplains acts in direct contradiction to the basicjustification for the chaplaincy itself.  In requiring chaplains to practice “pragmatic pluralism,”the military does not establish a particular version of religious truth, but instead directs itsofficers to perform the legitimate secular work of accommodating religion.Free exercise or speech claims by chaplains challenging pragmatic pluralism would besimilarly weak, at least outside the context of faith group worship.  Although we questioned theapplication of Garcetti to faith group worship, the reasoning adopted by the Court should applywithout reservation to the official conduct of chaplains outside of such worship.  When chaplainsengage in professional activities outside of worship and related religious activities such asinstruction and counseling, their role as agents of the military takes precedence over those
265 This assumes, of course, that a court would apply RFRA’s ordinary standards to a caseinvolving the military.  But there is every reason to believe that the more lenient standard ofGoldman v. Weinberger, which provides great deference to military judgments, would governapplication of RFRA in the military context, because RFRA is designed to restore religiousliberty to its pre-Smith status, and that status includes Goldman deference.  73
aspects of the role more properly seen as a delegation from their religious bodies.  In thesebroader professional activities, the job-related speech of chaplains should be under the samestrict controls as job-related speech of other military officers.A chaplain might assert that RFRA, which prohibits the federal government fromsubstantially burdening religious exercise unless the burden is necessary to accomplish acompelling governmental interest, protects his or her right to resist the dictates of minimalpluralism and its corollary of equal religious respect for all service members. RFRA-basedarguments by chaplains would fail, however, for want of a substantial burden, or on the strengthof the government’s interest in avoiding disharmony among servicemembers.265  A chaplain whooriginally agrees to work within a religiously pluralist environment is not likely to receive asympathetic hearing if the chaplain later asserts that conscientious performance of religiousduties requires active denigration of other chaplains or faiths.  The voluntary acceptance of therole undercuts the idea that the limits imposed on the chaplaincy is a “substantial burden” on thereligious freedom of its occupants. Even if a court agreed that a mandatory practice of pragmatic pluralism constitutes asubstantial burden on the chaplain’s religious exercise, the court would certainly find that thegovernment has a compelling interest in prohibiting religious disparagement by thosecommissioned to facilitate religious practices of all service members.  Such disparagement couldreasonably be seen as a threat to the cohesion of military units, and also as an obstacle to service
266 Veitch, 2005 US Dist LEXIS 6257, *7.74
members’ access to religious services, especially if the chaplain’s disrespectful attitude leadsservice members to avoid seeking his or her assistance, or the assistance of other chaplains. Unlike the concerns at issue in Rigdon, these threats are concrete, significant, and closely relatedto the restrictions imposed on chaplains’ expression.Pragmatic pluralism in the context of faith group worship.  The most difficult andinteresting questions arise in the context of faith group religious activities, and involve express orimplied denigrations of other faiths.  If the military may not require chaplains to embracereligious pluralism as a theological truth claim, may the military nonetheless prohibit chaplainsfrom disparaging other faiths in the course of faith group worship or instruction?  This issue ismost likely the one that would have been litigated had Veitch been granted standing to bring hisconstitutional challenges.  Although the investigating and charging officers (who were lineofficers, not chaplains) asserted the more robust form of pluralism, Veitch’s chaplain supervisorseemed to assert a more modest form.  In response to Veitch’s claim that he was beingdisciplined for preaching the doctrine of sola scriptura, the supervisor, Buchmiller, said “I hadno problem with Sola Scriptura as long as he was not being divisive and destroying thereputation of the other chaplains.”266  Buchmiller’s response demonstrates the challenge of enforcing pragmatic pluralism in theworship setting.  Veitch asserted that his faith required the preaching of “scripture alone,” but thedoctrine – a core commitment of the Protestant Reformation – necessarily implies the error ofother faith traditions, most specifically that of Roman Catholicism, which recognizes a broader
267 Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church (entries on Reformation and MartinLuther).
268 Martin Luther, On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church.  The phrase, taken fromRevelation 17:1-2, was a standard trope among critics of the church, even before theReformation. Heiko Oberman, The Reformation of the Sixteenth Century, XXX.75
ground of religious authority.267  Thus, the complaint that Veitch’s preaching was “anti-priest”likely reflects the chaplain’s rejection of religious authority as mediated by the church, aproclamation wholly bound up with another core conviction of the Reformation, sola gratia (“bygrace alone”), which also rejects the mediation of ecclesial authority.The Protestant-Roman Catholic division reflected in Veitch is hardly anomalous.  Mostfaith traditions define themselves, at least in part, through a denial of other beliefs.  From theShahada said by Muslims to the Shema of Jews to the Athanasian Creed (Quicumque vult) ofChristians, confessions explicitly or implicitly commit adherents to disavow other faiths.  Ofcourse, the manner in which a chaplain preaches or teaches the exclusivist message is likely to bethe trigger for military regulation or discipline, not the mere fact that the chaplain has assertedthe exclusive efficacy of one faith tradition.  For example, the military might not attempt toregulate the recitation of creeds, liturgy, or scripture verses that contain exclusivist claims, butmight have a different attitude toward chaplains that overtly and specifically condemn the faithtraditions of others.  A particularly vivid example of the latter would be Martin Luther’sdepiction of the Roman Catholic Church, and especially the office of the papacy, as the “Whoreof Babylon.”268Was Chaplain Buchmiller on solid constitutional ground when he admonished Veitch notto preach exclusivist doctrine in a manner that was “divisive” and “destroy[ed] the reputation of
269 Veitch, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6257, *7.
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other chaplains”?269  We described above the proper framework for judicial review of such aquestion.  While leading faith group worship, the chaplain is simultaneously an agent of anendorsing organization – and thus a private individual – and an officer of the government. Although the specific religious acts in worship are not attributable to the government, thegovernment nonetheless retains an important interest in how the chaplain’s role is conducted.  Inother words, the chaplain remains an instrument of government policy even in the act of leadingfaith group worship; the policy, broadly stated, is the government’s purpose of accommodatingservice members’ religious exercise in a way that does not cause destructive disharmony withinthe service.  The government, acting through military superiors, may regulate all facets of thechaplain’s performance in order to ensure that the chaplain is meeting the religious needs ofservice members, and doing so within the religiously pluralist environment of the military.Thus, Veitch’s supervisor would have two independent grounds for admonishing thechaplain for his divisive proclamation of exclusivist doctrines.  First, the military has an interestin ensuring that the religious convictions of all service members are accorded equal respect;pastoral injunctions to denigrate the beliefs of others may create an atmosphere of religiousintolerance.  Second, the military has an interest in maintaining “individual and unit readiness,health and safety, discipline, morale, and cohesion.”270  Divisive preaching and religiousinstruction may pose a legitimate threat to unit morale and cohesion, especially if the religiousclaims relate to the moral character and trustworthiness of non-adherent fellow service members.To justify regulation of a chaplain’s conduct in faith group worship, the military would
271 For a vigorous defense of the idea that the Establishment Clause forbids government-sponsored denigration of anyone’s religious beliefs, see Christopher L. Eisgruber and LawrenceG. Sager, Religious Freedom and the Constitution (Harvard University Press, 2007), at 124-28.  
272 Hutcheson, supra note **, at 86-87; Kenneth W. Bush, Military Worship Wars:Blended Worship as a Pastoral Response, The Army Chaplaincy (Winter-Spring 2003).77
need to show that the specific manner of proclamation, and not merely the content of thedoctrine, materially harmed or threatened the military’s interests.  Such regulation would notpresent the establishment clause problems noted in connection with maximal pluralism, becausethe military would not be requiring chaplains to preach a specific doctrine, or even forbiddingproclamation of a faith tradition’s exclusivist confession.  Instead, the military would onlyspecify that proclamations must not specifically denigrate the religious beliefs of others.271  Free exercise or free speech claims by chaplains opposed to such restriction likely wouldbe resolved on the question of the government’s interest in regulating the speech, and on thespecific means used to further that interest.  In this respect, the traditional concerns aboutmechanisms for regulating speech would be important, such as the clarity of the restriction, theextent of discretion accorded to officials charged with regulating the speech, and opportunitiesfor prompt review of officials’ decisions.  Those concerns, however, are more likely to involvethe manner in which the military implemented the restriction, rather than the possibility thatsome type of restriction could withstand substantive constitutional scrutiny.  Buchmiller maywell have stood on solid ground in his admonitions to Veitch.Collective Protestant WorshipThe practice of faith group worship raises a very different set of constitutional questionsin the context of a common practice, the “Collective Protestant” worship service.272  Because of
273 Different faith groups may gather separately and regularly for special occasions. 
274 Hutcheson, supra note **, at 87. 78
the broad array of Protestant denominations, it is sometimes impossible – and frequentlyinefficient – to plan regular chapel worship for a single Protestant denomination, or to prepare fordistinctive rites such as baptism or confirmation.273  Instead, chapel programs typically offer a“Collective Protestant” worship service, in which a chaplain from one denomination leadsworship for congregants representing a broad array of traditions.274  It is possible, and perhapseven likely for chaplains coming from smaller denominations, that none of the congregantswould be from the chaplain’s faith group.The constitutional issues surrounding Collective Protestant worship all stem from the onedistinctive feature of the practice: there is no religious body called “Collective Protestantism,” sothe military chaplaincy creates a religious community, and in the process decides on the hymnodyand liturgy of this military religious community.  This contrasts sharply with Roman Catholicworship, and to a somewhat lesser degree with Jewish and Orthodox Christian worship, all ofwhich involve forms and content of worship that are proscribed by tradition or ecclesial authorityoutside the military.  In our earlier discussion of the chaplain’s role in leading worship, wefocused on the extent to which the chaplain derived religious authority from an endorsing body,not from the government.  When the military determines, however, that worship should beconducted in a way that includes a wide range of Protestant denominations, the institutionalresponsibility for the worship might reasonably be thought to shift from the chaplain’s endorsingbody to the military chaplaincy itself.  Such a shift would render the chaplaincy more vulnerableto establishment clause challenge, because it suggests that the government has become the author
275 Armed Forces Chaplaincy Board, Book of Worship for United States Forces 574-90(1974) (different versions of “Order of Worship, Protestant”); Bush, supra note **, at XXX.
276 Hutcheson, supra note **, at 86.
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of religious experience, rather than simply the provider of opportunities for religious experiencesauthored or directed by others.Although the concern is theoretically reasonable, the practice of Collective Protestantworship suggests that the concern is misplaced, or at least overstated.  Chaplains themselvesdetermine the form of worship that a particular Collective Protestant worship service will use. The military does not specify an order of worship, liturgy, or set of hymns, although thechaplaincy publishes worship materials with options that chaplains may select.275  Chaplains mayadopt materials exclusively from their own tradition, but they generally select worship styles thatwill appeal to congregants from a wide array of denominations.   As Hutcheson notes, “the factthat most Protestant chaplains do make such adjustments is not an indictment but an indication oftheir desire to minister effectively.”276  He goes on to suggest that the Collective Protestantworship services reflects the present widespread permeability between Protestant denominationsin the broader society, along with the growing number and size of non-denominational Protestantcongregations.277  The significant diversity of worship styles even within a single Protestantdenomination reinforce Hutcheson’s sense that the Collective Protestant worship experiencemirrors the existing shape of American Protestant worship.The practice is somewhat complicated when the Collective Protestant worship serviceinvolves multiple chaplains, with a superior making the final judgment about particular elements
278 Id. at 87 80
of the worship.  Those disagreements might include preferences for greater or less formality inworship; the use of traditional hymns and musical accompaniment or contemporary songs andinstrumentation; the frequency and practice of administration of sacraments; or a wide variety ofother aspects of worship.  Such a “command decision” on the content of Collective Protestantworship, however, does not indicate an official establishment of “Collective Protestantism.” Instead, it demonstrates just one among many local and shifting settlements about how theworship should be conducted, arrangements that will shift further when existing chaplains departand new chaplains arrive.  These shifting practices should be driven primarily by an assessmentof the needs of the worshiping community, although the chaplain will inevitably interpret thoseneeds through the prism of the chaplain’s own religious experience and faith tradition.278  Seen inthis light, the Collective Protestant worship reflects a reasonable attempt by the militarychaplaincy to respond to the diverse worship needs of Protestant Christians.  Indeed, manychapels now offer a range of Collective Protestant worship experiences, including Praise (orContemporary), Gospel (traditionally African-American), Liturgical, and Hispanic Protestant.  Chaplains may be excused from participating in Collective Protestant worship if theyobject, on grounds of religious conscience, to the form or content of the worship.  Nonetheless,even Protestant faith traditions that have a long history of denominational distinctness often findways in which their clergy may lead Collective Protestant worship.  The practices of the LutheranChurch - Missouri Synod (LCMS) provide an especially useful example.  The LCMS is wellknown for its opposition to current trends in Protestant ecumenism, which seeks to reduce oreliminate the distinctiveness of Protestant groups, and has been especially influential among the
279 Daniel J. Wakin, Seeing Heresy In a Service For Sept. 11; Pastor Is Under Fire ForInterfaith Prayers, New York Times, Feb. 8, 2002, at B1. See also Daniel J. Wakin, Preparing toTake on His Church, New York Times, July 10, 2002, at B3.
280 Lutheran Panel Reinstates Pastor After Post-9/11 Interfaith Service, New York Times,May 13, 2003, at B4. 
281 Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, Chaplain Guidelines (Rev. 2004). Online at:http://www.lcms.org/graphics/assets/media/World%20Mission/Chaplain-Guidelines.pdf
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“mainline” churches.  In recent years, the LCMS made national headlines when it sought todiscipline one of its pastors, Rev. Dr. David H. Benke, for his participation in an interfaith prayerservices in the days following the September 11, 2001 attacks.279  Benke was charged withsyncretism, for publicly praying with non-Christians, and implying the equality of faiths.  He wasalso charged with unionism, for praying with Christians outside the Lutheran confession, andimplying the equal truth of all Christian confessions.  Although Benke was later acquitted of thecharges, the episode reveals the depth of the LCMS tradition against participation in worshipwith non-Lutherans.280Nonetheless, the LCMS has created a pattern of ministry for its endorsed militarychaplains that makes significant room for pluralist practices.281  The Synod’s guidelines endorsethe participation of LCMS chaplains in cooperative ministry with other chaplains, “[a]s long as aLCMS chaplain is not directed to do anything contrary to the Holy Scriptures and the LutheranConfessions.”282  Specifically, the LCMS chaplain may support or supervise the work of other,non-Lutheran chaplains, provide pastoral care to all service members and their families, andfacilitate the religious exercise of those of any faith.  As long as the elements of worship do notcontradict the church body’s confessions, LCMS chaplains may lead Collective Protestant
283 Id. at 25.
284 Id. at 24.
285 See AFI 52-101, supra note **, at § 2.1; AR 165-1, supra note **, at § 4-4.e.;OPNAVINST 1730.1D, supra note **, at § 5.e.(11).82
services.  The LCMS chaplaincy guidelines limit this cooperation in two ways: LCMS chaplainsshould not lead worship, or participate in other religious services, with non-Lutheran clergy; andLCMS clergy should only lead communion services for Lutheran congregations.  Thus, LCMSclergy can lead Collective Protestant services so long as the services do not involve sharedpastoral leadership with non-Lutheran clergy, and as long as the service does not includecommunion.  The guidelines urge LCMS chaplains to “cooperate with other chaplains who canfulfill denominational needs that they are unable to meet.”283Finally, the LCMS guidelines remind chaplains that, as a matter of the regulationscovering chaplains in all branches of the military, they may decline to perform any religious actsthat are contrary to the teachings of their faith.284  This right of all chaplains to object, on groundsof religious conscience, to participation in assigned religious tasks is an important aspect of thepractice of Collective Protestant worship.285  This practice rests on voluntary cooperation bychaplains – and of course by congregants – in designing and participating in a worship servicethat typically includes parts of worship that are broadly shared among Protestant churches.  [break into new paragraph]In this respect, the service represents a conscious tradeoff byboth the chaplaincy and the military parishioners.  They exchange the distinctiveness, but likelysmall numbers, of worship restricted to a particular denomination, for the diverse and morebroadly attended experience of Collective Protestant worship.  Chaplains remain willing to
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facilitate, where possible, the distinctive practices of Protestant bodies, as of other faith groups,but the Establishment Clause does not permits the military to facilitate arrangements for worshipthat involve non-distinctive approaches to prayer.The practice of Collective Protestant worship raises one final question.  If a Protestantchaplain refuses, on religious grounds, to lead Collective Protestant worship, and restrictsperformance of religious acts to those of the chaplain’s own faith group, may the military takesuch a refusal into account in evaluating the chaplain’s fitness for continues service?  Themilitary services expressly permit chaplains to exercise such objections, so one might assumethat the objections are not prejudicial to the chaplain’s career.  Although the military may takethat approach, they are under no obligation to ignore the significance of objections.  As notedabove, the military decides on accessions (both into the chaplaincy of the Reserve Components,and also into Active Duty service) based, at least in part, on the specific religious needs ofservice members.  If a Protestant chaplain is willing to lead Collective Protestant worship, he orshe will be able to serve a broader range of service members than a chaplain who is willing onlyto conduct worship for a specific Protestant denomination.  The military does not engage inimpermissible religious discrimination if it takes a chaplain’s attitude toward CollectiveProtestant worship into account, so long as the decision is grounded on the underlyingjustification for the chaplaincy, the accommodation of service members’ religious needs.IV.2.b. Prayer at Official CeremoniesOver the past several years, the practice of public prayer by military chaplains has
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attracted more attention and controversy than any other aspect of the chaplaincy.286  Controversyover the practice has focused on the singular question of whether chaplains may offer sectarianprayers at military ceremonies.  More specifically, conservative and evangelical Protestantchaplains assert the freedom to pray “in the name of Jesus Christ,” regardless of the context inwhich the prayer is offered.287  This question has produced an ongoing political and legal battle.  In February 2006, boththe Air Force and the Navy issued guidelines that included restrictions on the use of sectarianlanguage in ceremonial prayer.288  The Air Force guidelines arose from a broad review ofreligious practices and policies originally sparked by allegations of religious intolerance andinappropriate proselytizing at the Air Force Academy.289  The guidelines provided the followingadvice concerning ceremonial prayers:Public prayer should not imply government endorsement of religion and shouldnot usually be a part of routine business.  Mutual respect and common senseshould always be applied, including consideration of unusual circumstances andthe needs of the command.  Further, non-denominational, inclusive prayer or a
290 AF Revised Interim Guidelines, supra note **.
291 SECNAVINST 1730.7C (February 21, 2006) (rescinded by direction of legislativeconferees on Defense appropriations bill).  See also Navy Chief of Chaplains, Official Statementon Public Prayer in the Navy.
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moment of silence may be appropriate for military ceremonies or events of specialimportance when its primary purpose is not the advancement of religious beliefs. Military chaplains are trained in these matters.290Later that same month, the Secretary of the Navy issued a new instruction covering awide range of issues involving religion.  This instruction carried similar advice regardingceremonial prayer:In planning command functions, commanders shall determine whether a religiouselement is appropriate. In considering the appropriateness for including a religiouselement, commanders, with appropriate advice from a chaplain, should assess thesetting and context of the function; the diversity of faith that may be representedamong the participants; and whether the function is mandatory for all hands. Otherthan Divine/Religious Services, religious elements for a command function,absent extraordinary circumstances, should be non-sectarian in nature.  Neitherthe participation of chaplain, nor the inclusion of a religious element, in and ofthemselves, renders a command function a Divine Service or public worship.291Moreover, the Navy instruction explicitly assigned responsibility to commanders, ratherthan chaplains, for the content of ceremonial prayer.  The Navy instruction continued: Once a commander determines a religious element is appropriate, the chaplainmay choose to participate based on his or her faith constraints. If the chaplainchooses not to participate, he or she may do so with no adverse consequences.Anyone accepting a commander's invitation to provide religious elements at acommand function is accountable for following the commander's guidance.292
Opponents of the new policies, both inside and outside the military, focused on both thecontent restrictions and the allocation of command authority.  These critics argued that the
293 American Center for Law & Justice, Update on Military Chaplains & Prayer, online at:http://www.aclj.org/News/Readwr.aspx?ID=2498.
294 The National Association of Evangelicals, Statement on Religious Freedom forSoldiers and Military Chaplains (February 7, 2006); NCMAF News Release (February 9, 2006). These two groups represent a wide range of religious bodies that endorse military chaplains. 
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restrictions on prayer violated the rights of chaplains by forbidding them from praying in themanner required by their religious beliefs, and by subjecting the content of their prayers tooversight by military superiors.  Led by the American Center for Law and Justice, Focus on theFamily, and a number of other conservative and evangelical Protestant organizations, opponentsof the policies attracted the attention of federal legislators.293  In response to these efforts, a  number of influential organizations came forward toactively support the Air Force and Navy polices.  Both the National Association of Evangelicalsand the National Conference on Ministry to the Armed Forces expressed their approval ofinclusive prayer in ceremonial settings.294Responding favorably to the conservative critique, the House  approved legislation thatwould have given military chaplains “the prerogative to pray according to the dictates of thechaplain’s own conscience, except as must be limited by military necessity, with any suchlimitation being imposed in the least restrictive manner feasible.”295  The Senate did not passsuch a measure, and the House provision was dropped in conference over the 2007 DefenseAppropriations Act.  As a compromise between the contending forces, however, the confereesdemanded that the Navy and Air Force rescind the policy directives concerning non-sectarian
296 Conference Report, DW110-H590-Military Chaplains, Sept. 25, 2006.
297 Air Force Directive 52-1 (reinstated October 2. 2006).
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prayer at military ceremonies.296  In the wake of the legislative conferees’ direction to rescind thechallenged policies, the Air Force and Navy have reinstated the guidelines on chaplaincy thatwere in place before the 2006 revisions.297  The preexisting guidelines do not address the issue ofceremonial prayer, although a policy letter by the Navy Chief of Chaplains,298 which containsessentially the same instructions on ceremonial prayer as the rescinded guidelines, still appears tobe in effect.The debate over chaplains’ ceremonial prayer raises questions of the chaplains’ assertedright to pray as their faith requires, as well as the potential establishment clause limitations onceremonial prayers at certain military events.  The context for both inquiries is the same. Military chaplains are regularly asked to provide an invocation or other prayer at a militarycommand ceremony, such as a dining in299 or change of command.  The ceremony will usuallyinclude servicemembers who are required to attend, and the chaplain will typically appear inmilitary uniform (rather than worship vestments).  Finally, service regulations provide thatchaplains are free to decline, without prejudice, invitations to pray at military ceremonies, thoughmost chaplains acknowledge experiencing some degree of expectation that they will participate.On the question of a chaplain’s right to pray “according to the dictates of the chaplain’sown conscience” as part of a military ceremony to which the chaplain has been invited,
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proponents of such a right have invoked a variety of different legal bases.  These include thechaplain’s constitutional or statutory rights to free exercise of religion and free speech;300  theregulatory or statutory provisions that authorize chaplains “to conduct rites, sacraments, andservices as required by their respective denominations;”301 and asserted Establishment Clauselimits on governmental endorsement of a theological position – in this case, the positionassociated with a requirement that ceremonial prayer be non-sectarian.With respect to the constitutional or statutory rights of expression and religious exercise,proponents of unrestricted prayer at ceremonies contend that the proposed policies reflect  Noneof the proponents arguments is persuasive.  The free speech claim founders on the SupremeCourt’s decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos,302 discussed above, which held that governmentemployees do not enjoy constitutional protection for job-related expression in the course of theiremployment.  The only way that chaplains could avoid the implications of Garcetti would be toargue that ceremonial prayer is an act of private speech, but such a claim is utterly unsustainablecannot be sustained in this context.  The chaplain is invited to pray precisely because of thechaplain’s official position, and the chaplain participates because such acts are deemed part ofthe chaplain’s official role within the military.303  While there are settings in which it might be
304 The argument would depend on the extent to which the invitation to deliver the prayer- and the broader context of the ceremony - might be reasonably understood to reflect thepreferences of an individual (perhaps a person being honored in retirement) rather than thegovernment.  In Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005), a case involving achallenge to sectarian prayers in the Indiana legislature, appellants have raised the private speechforum argument in their briefs defending the practice.  Hinrichs remains pending on appeal in the7th Circuit.
305 Arthur Schulcz, Blow the Trumpet in Zion, ICECE Newsletter, October 2006.  Mr.Schulz is not a disinterested scholar; he represents the plaintiffs in Larsen and other casesinvolving evangelical Christians who are suing the military with respect to the current policiesgoverning chaplains.
306 See McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (invlaidatingdisplay of Ten Commandments because it had been undertaken for constitutionally forbiddenpurposes of promoting religious ideas). 89
reasonable to claim that a speaker invited to pray at a ceremonial function does so as a privateindividual, and thus enjoys some protection for the content of that prayer,304 the ceremonialprayers of military chaplains possess none of those characteristics.  The most ambitious – but least plausible – argument under the Speech Clause is thatprayer by chaplains at ceremonies must be private speech, because official religious speech atsuch functions would violate the Establishment Clause.305  That argument, however, iscompletely self-serving and entirely illogical.  It is akin to arguing that the display of the TenCommandments in the McCreary County Courthouse must represent the private speech of theCounty Commissioners because the display would violate the Establishment Clause if it wereattributed to the County.306     By this logic, all governmental expression is support of sectarianreligion could be redefined as the private speech of some government official, and therefore freeof Establishment Clause restrictions.  There is no reason to expect courts to be persuaded by thissophistry; the law determines whether or not speech is public or private by looking at the context
307 Id.  Klingenschmitt v. Winter, Case No. 1:106-cv-01832-HHK , at ¶¶ 33, 43, 111, 118,122 (DDC, complaint filed October 25, 2006) (hereafter Klingenschmitt complaint).  A similarclaim has been raised in a recent lawsuit over restrictions on sectarian prayer in a city council. Turner v. City Council of the City of Fredericksburg (E.D.Va. 2007) (online at:http://www.rutherford.org/PDF/turner%20complaint.pdf).90
in which the speaker operates, not by the completely result-oriented technique of examining firstthe constitutional consequence of labeling speech as private or official.The free exercise claims of chaplains are no more compelling than the assertions of freespeech rights.  Proponents of faith-specific ceremonial prayer make two different kinds ofarguments.  One asserts that the restriction on sectarian prayer discriminates against Protestantevangelicals, for whom prayer “in the name of Jesus” is a religious obligation.307  Such adefinition of discrimination has no support in constitutional jurisprudence.  The restrictions onceremonial prayer are formally neutral with respect to all denominations.   No person may prayusing the distinctive terms of a particular faith group, and especially the distinctive name for thefaith group’s understanding of divinity.  Muslims, Jews, and Christians of all stripes are equallybound by the regulation.  It is undoubtedly true that some find it easier to work within suchrestrictions, while others experience the restrictions as unreasonable constraints.  The same couldbe said, however, of the chaplaincy’s fundamental expectations of pluralism.  Not all ministers orfaith groups are willing to accept the limitations on ministry imposed by the norm of pluralism,even in its more pragmatic form.  Their unwillingness to accept the restrictions of pluralisticministry does not transform the chaplaincy’s norm into a forbidden discrimination. The other claim of religious liberty, advanced by the defenders of sectarian prayer atmilitary ceremonies,  relies on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).  Proponents ofthis position assert that the restrictions on ceremonial prayer impose a substantial burden on the
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religious liberty of chaplains, and that the burden is not justified as the least restrictive means toachieve a compelling government interest.308  It is unlikely that a court would find the restrictionon prayer to be a substantial burden on free exercise, because the military regulations alreadyexcuse any chaplain from participating in ceremonial prayers if such prayers are inconsistent withthe chaplain’s religious beliefs.309  Such opt-outs have always been deemed a sufficient means foraddressing both free exercise and free speech concerns about government-compelled speech.310 The only cases in which opt-outs have been found constitutionally insufficient involve practicesthat violate the Establishment Clause, such as prayer in public schools.311   In order to escape the dilemma of proferred opt-outs as a fully sufficient response to theirconcerns, those who oppose the restrictions on sectarian prayer at ceremonies contend that suchrestrictions violate the Establishment Clause by creating a preference for nonsectarian religionover sectarian religion.312  Any attempt to define prayer along those lines, they argue, reflectsgovernmental endorsement of a particular version of religious faith.313  This argument is closelyrelated to the claim that ceremonial prayer must be treated as private speech in order to surviveestablishment clause scrutiny, and the argument suffers from the same fundamental defect.  The
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defect is evident in proponents’ reliance on Lee v. Weisman314 as authority for this argument.315  In Lee, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a practice of nonsectarian prayer at publicschool graduation ceremonies.316  The Court ruled that the nonsectarian quality of the prayer wasirrelevant; any form of government-sponsored prayer in public schools violates the EstablishmentClause.317  The decision does not stand for the proposition that nonsectarian and sectarian prayerare legally indistinguishable in all contexts, and it certainly does not stand for the proposition thatthe defect in the practice rested in the school’s failure to label the prayer as private speech. Instead, Lee v. Weisman reflects the Court’s heightened sensitivity about the coercive effect ofreligious exercises in public schools.  Outside that context, many courts have been willing torecognize a distinction between nonsectarian invocations and sectarian prayers, permitting theformer but not the latter in public ceremonies.318  Indeed the Supreme Court’s decision in Marshv. Chambers, which upheld against Establishment Clause challenge the practice of legislative
319 Marsh, 463 U.S. 783, 794-95 (1983).
320 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
321 Id. at 784-85.
322 Id. at 786-92.
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prayer, suggested the importance of that distinction.319The claim that non-sectarian and sectarian prayer are constitutionally indistinguishable –that either both are forbidden or both are permitted –  ultimately fails for reasons deeply rooted inEstablishment Clause norms.   Ceremonial prayer in the military is most persuasively analogizedto legislative prayer, a practice upheld by the Court in Marsh v. Chambers.320  In Marsh,plaintiffs challenged the existence of a paid chaplain for the Nebraska’s state legislature, and thelegislature’s practice of opening each day of the session with a prayer by the chaplain.321  TheCourt held that Nebraska’s legislative chaplaincy did not violate the Establishment Clause,although the rationale for the holding is complicated and contested.  Much of the Court’s opinion in Marsh focused on the long history of the practice oflegislative prayer, which had continued for over a century in Nebraska, tracking a similar patternwhich had persisted since the beginning days of the federal legislature.322  The Court found thatthis history suggests that the drafters of the First Amendment did not regard legislativechaplaincies as religious establishments.323  The Court’s decision did not turn on history alone, however.  The Court identified severalfeatures of the prayer – historical and present – that substantially mitigated concerns about
324 Id. at 793-95.
325 Id. at 792.
326 Id.
327 Id. at 794-95.
328 Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004); Rubin v. City ofBurbank, 101 Cal. App. 4th 1194, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 867 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 2002).94
religious establishments.324   First, the Court said that “the Founding Fathers looked atinvocations as ‘conduct whose . . . effect . . .[harmonized] with the tenets of some or allreligions.’ The Establishment Clause does not always bar a state from regulating conduct simplybecause it ‘harmonizes with religious canons.’”325 Although its explanation is not a model ofclarity, the Court appeared to be arguing that legislative prayers should not be treated as religiousactivities, but as a solemnizing event that “harmonizes” with the religious activity of prayer. Second, the Court emphasized that those who claimed injury from the legislative prayer wereadults, and thus “presumably not readily susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination.’”326 Third, theCourt said that the content of prayer was not material to the constitutionality of the practice“where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has been exploited toproselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”327Taken together, these three features suggest the boundaries of the Court’s reliance onhistory to uphold the practice of legislative prayer.  Although lower courts have increasinglywrestled with application of these boundaries in a variety of legislative settings, from statelegislatures to local school boards, these courts have also recognized that Marsh does not provideblanket justification for every practice that might be called “legislative prayer.”328  Context has
329 Coles v. Tracy, 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999) (striking down school board prayer);Bacus v. Palo Verde Unified School District Board of Education, 52 Fed. App'x 355 (9th Cir.2002) (unpublished order) (same).
330 Wynne v. Town of Great Falls, 376 F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004) (striking down practice ofsectarian prayer); Simpson v. Chesterfield County Board of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir.2005) (upholding practice of nonsectarian prayer, but permitting board to deny invitation toWiccan practitioner because no general invitation is extended to the public).
331 The Court in Lee emphasized the coercive effect of the prayers, even at a formallyoptional event like a middle school or high school graduation. 505 U.S. at xxx.  The coerciveeffect of prayer upon service members compelled to attend a ceremony is obviously stronger thanthat involved in Lee.  See also Mellen v. Bunting, 327 F. 355 (4th Cir. 2003) (enjoining supperprayer at Virginia Military Institute on grounds of its coercive effect on cadets).95
played an important role in these decisions.  Courts have distinguished traditional publiclegislative assemblies, in which adult participants come and go freely, from settings such asmeetings of public school boards, which schoolchildren may sometimes be required to attend.329 Courts have also examined the types of prayer offered, and a number of decisions haveconcluded that a pattern of sectarian prayers should be treated differently than the practice atissue in Marsh.330This twofold concern about context and content guides application of Marsh to chaplains’prayers at military ceremonies.  In sharp contrast to ordinary legislative assemblies, servicemembers are typically commanded to attend military ceremonies, and thus do not have the optionof avoiding prayer if they desire to do so.  In this respect, service members more closelyapproximate schoolchildren, despite the difference in age.331  The fact that service membersattend ceremonies under orders is also relevant to assessment of the prayers’ content.  Marshsuggested that legislative prayers would be constitutionally vulnerable if they were “exploited toproselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”  A court might be
332 Simpson v. Chesterfield County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276, 282-83 (4th Cir.2005) (discussing Marsh, 463 U.S. 783, 792).
333 463 U.S. at xxx. 96
unwilling to treat the simple coda “in Jesus’ name” as exploitative in a legislative setting, wherelisteners are at liberty to excuse themselves, but the same phrase might be treated quitedifferently in prayer before a “captive audience.”The application of Marsh to the context of military ceremonies underscores theimplausibility of the claim made by proponents of sectarian prayer that such prayers areindistinguishable from non-sectarian prayers.  That claim assumes that both sectarian and non-sectarian prayers constitute religious activities.  But Marsh and its lower court progeny dependon the finding that, at least in some circumstances, prayers are not religious activities, but secularactivities that “harmonize” with common religious practices.332  The three features identified bythe Court in Marsh focus on the extent to which legislative prayer resembles a religious activity,including the purpose of the prayer’s message and the experience of the audience.  The more thepractice resembles a normal religious event, the less likely the practice will withstand challengeunder the Establishment Clause.  Seen in that light, the practice of sectarian prayer at militaryceremonies is far more constitutionally vulnerable than most legislative prayer.Even if sectarian prayer at military ceremonies does not represent a categorical violationof the Establishment Clause, the possibility that it might be such a violation generatesdiscretionary authority in the military to forbid prayer of that character.   Under Marsh,  sectarianprayer that is  “exploited to proselytize or advance any one . . . faith or belief”333at ceremonieswould violate the Establishment Clause.  The concern to guard against violation of that standard
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would provide the military with a zone of discretion, in which courts would be highly unlikely tosecond-guess determinations of the appropriate content for such prayers, especially given the“captive audience” for ceremonial prayers in the military setting.A variety of powerful constitutional themes – the anti-coercion concern expressed in Lee,the boundaries of ceremonial prayer suggested in Marsh, and the deference to military authorities with respect to religion as expressed in Goldman – thus coalesce to support a military policyprecluding sectarian prayer at ceremonies.  Whatever “burdens” such a preclusion may impose onthe religious liberty interests of chaplains, anti-coercion concerns for service members inattendance and respect for Establishment Clause norms amply satisfy RFRA’s requirement ofcompelling interests as well as any constitutionally-based requirement to justify such apreclusion.  In addition, the policy of “minimal religious pluralism,’ discussed above, provides yetone more reason to restrict sectarian prayer in ceremonial settings which service members areobliged to attend.  Indeed, all the arguments for minimal pluralism, and against a theory ofchaplains’ rights that would undercut such pluralism, are far stronger in the setting of ceremonialprayer than in the context of worship services.  For that reason, the suggestion that the problemof sectarian prayer can be solved by permitting service members who object to such prayer to“opt-out” of the relevant ceremonies seems profoundly misplaced.   The military inevitably mustchoose between chaplains’ rights to pray as they choose in official ceremonies, and servicemembers’ rights to not be driven from those ceremonies by hostile or alienating religioussentiments.  In addition to considerations of law, the concern for religious pluralism and theaccompanying spirit of unity that the military seeks to inspire points strenuously in favor of a
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restriction on sectarian prayer in these settings.IV.2.c Pastoral CareIssues of religious discrimination, pluralism, and sectarian public prayers have capturedsignificant public attention, but the practice of pastoral care by military chaplains might prove tobe even more constitutionally sensitive and complex.  Pastoral care encompasses a broad rangeof encounters between clergy and others, and these encounters may occur in an equally broadrange of settings.  Chaplains visit the sick or injured in hospitals, engage in formal counselingsessions with servicemembers and their families, hear private confession from congregants, talkinformally with soldiers as they ride along on a convoy or share a meal at a forward operatingbase, or sit with a colleague over coffee in a headquarters office building.The diverse contexts of pastoral care give rise to the constitutional complexity of thepractice, because a model of such care appropriate in one setting may be legally problematic inanother.  Consider two common occasions for pastoral care.  In the first, a service member visitsthe post chapel on a large domestic installation, and makes an appointment with a specificchaplain, one of six clergy of different and clearly identified faiths on the chapel staff.  In thesecond, a military hospital chaplain visits the room of an injured servicemember, to determinethe patient’s religious needs.  Under normal circumstances, the first chaplain  can reasonablyassume that the service member scheduled the appointment because of the chaplain’s distinctivereligious commitments.  The chaplain’s care might involve religious instruction and – if theservice member did not share the chaplain’s faith, or did not embrace it with full intensity –perhaps even efforts at religious persuasion .  Such a robust religious encounter between chaplainand service member fits perfectly within the model of religious accommodation.  The
334 Note on CPE; described in district court opinion in Carter v. Broadlawns MedicalCenter, 667 F. Supp. 1269, 1272-73 (S.D. Iowa 1987), affirmed in part and modified in part, 857F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1988).  See also FFRF v. Nicholson (describing CPE model).
335 782 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1986).
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servicemember selected this particular opportunity for religious experience from a menu ofchoices, and did so in a context that appears to minimize the risk of exploitation.In the second context, however, the model of robust religious encounter sits uneasily withthe constitutional structure of religious accommodation.  The injured service member is notlikely to have selected this particular chaplain, and the hospital setting suggests the possibilitythat the service member might be especially vulnerable to attempts at religious indoctrination orinfluence .  In this context, the military must require chaplains to adopt a model of pastoral carethat affords heightened protection for the service member.  Such a model, reflected in thestandards for Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE), emphasizes the responsive character of pastoralcare.334  The chaplain elicits and develops the patient’s own religious commitments, rather thanimposing on the patient the religious views of the chaplain.Indeed, every court that has considered a constitutional challenge to a hospital chaplaincyprogram has approved of the CPE model of responsive care, and suggested the constitutionalinfirmity of a model that would permit proselytizing by chaplains.  In Baz v. Walters,335 theSeventh Circuit rejected an employment discrimination claim brought by a former chaplain in theVeterans Administration hospital system.  The chaplain claimed, among other things, that thehospital dismissed him from his position because he refused, on religious grounds, to conform tothe “institutional theology” of pastoral care established by the VA.336  This institutional theology,
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he argued, prohibited him from engaging in the explicitly evangelical outreach to patients that hisfaith required.  The court rejected his claim, and said that the VA’s restrictions on his chaplaincywere constitutionally required.[T]he V.A. must ensure that the existence of the chaplaincy does not createestablishment clause problems. Unleashing a government--paid chaplain who seeshis primary role as proselytizing upon a captive audience of patients could doexactly that. The V.A. has established rules and regulations to ensure that thosepatients who do not wish to entertain a chaplain's ministry need not be exposed toit. Far from defining its own institutional theology, the medical and religiousstaffs at Danville are merely attempting to walk a fine constitutional line whilesafeguarding the health and well--being of the patients.337The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Carter v. Broadlawns MedicalCenter,338 which involved an Establishment Clause challenge to a public hospital chaplaincyprogram.  The court ruled that the chaplaincy program did not violate the Establishment Clausebecause the chaplain’s role was designed to accommodate the religious needs of hospital patientsand their families.339  In reaching its conclusion, the court emphasized the CPE model of pastoralcare, in which “the religious content in [the chaplain’s] services to a patient depended entirely onthe patient’s preexisting preferences.”340  The court also stressed the important role played by thepaid chaplain in “supervis[ing] the volunteer chaplains to make sure they abide by the non-proselytization principles of C.P.E.”341
342 (W.D. Wisc. 2007).  See our analysis of this decision at RT websitehttp://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/legal/legal_update_display.cfm?id=55.
343 Id. at *6.
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Most recently, in Freedom From Religion Foundation v. Nicholson,342 a federal districtcourt rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)healthcare chaplaincy program.  The complaint alleged that the VA unconstitutionally integratesreligion into all aspects of its healthcare, and that it does so through the chaplaincy’s systematicengagement with each patient admitted to the hospital system.  The court dismissed the lawsuit,because it determined that the chaplaincy program represented a constitutionally legitimateaccommodation of the free exercise needs of patients in VA facilities.  As in Baz and Carter, thecourt emphasized the structure and limitations of CPE-model chaplaincy, and found the VA’sembrace of that model to be constitutionally dispositive.  CPE-trained chaplains, the court found,assist patients to develop the patients’ own religious beliefs and spiritual resources, rather than“initiating or guiding religious instruction.”343  Moreover, the VA’s CPE-trained chaplains “areproactive in eliminating proselytizing from their hospitals.  As such, VA pastoral care is religiousin content only if that is the wish of a given patient.”344These first two settings of pastoral care – the large base chapel and the military hospital –represent opposite ends of a spectrum, with maximal religious choice and minimal vulnerabilityat one end, and minimal choice and heightened vulnerability at the other.  Between these twopoles, however, lie much more difficult questions about the practice of pastoral care.  Considertwo additional and equally common situations.  In the third, a service member and her husband,
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who are having marital difficulties, visit the base Family Life Center, which offers trainedpastoral counseling and support groups.  The service member’s unit commander suggested thatshe seek help from the Center, because her family trouble was interfering with her work.  In thefourth, a service member seeks the counsel of his unit chaplain, who is deployed with the unit ina remote operating base in Iraq.The third setting – the Family Life Center – offers a number of features found in each ofthe first two settings.  On the one hand, the service member visits the pastoral counselorvoluntarily, and we might reasonably presume that other opportunities or resources for maritalcounseling are available within the community.  On the other hand, the Center may hold itself outas a religiously inclusive service provider, more akin to a healthcare facility than a chapel, and sothe service member’s encounter with a particular chaplain should not be taken as acceptance ofreligious content that chaplain might offer.  Moreover, the specific need for counseling –especially on recommendation of a superior – might indicate some degree of vulnerability toreligious influence, though perhaps not to the extent present in the hospital setting.We would expect a military pastoral counseling center to resolve this uncertainty throughspecific guidance for chaplains on the content of their care.  Such guidance might include formalagreements with potential clients about the character and extent of religious language andcommitments in the counseling sessions, or other mechanisms to ensure that clients directed thereligious content.  Within the constitutional framework of accommodation, even thickly religiouscounseling may be appropriate, so long as the recipients of such counseling have givenmeaningful consent to receiving it.The fourth setting shares the ambiguities present in the third, although in a significantly
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different context.  As in the first example, the servicemember visits the chaplain voluntarily, withfull awareness of the chaplain’s religious identity.  However, the parallels with the first exampleend at that point.  In a remote area, the service member who wishes to confide in a chaplain is notlikely to have a great deal of choice; unless he waits for the occasional visit of clergy of differentfaiths to provide formal worship, the service  member will have contact only with the unit’sassigned chaplain.  The service member, of course, may happen to share that chaplain’s faithtradition, in which case this setting more closely approximates the first.  It is more likely,however, that the service member and chaplain will not be of the same faith group.  The specialvulnerability associated with likely exposure to combat magnifies concern for the servicemember, and brings this setting closer to that of chaplaincy in a hospital environment.Moreover, in  contrast to the first three settings, this one presents a special challengebecause of the difficulty of formalizing or monitoring the relationship between chaplain andservice member.  The relationship may have pre-existed the situation of danger, but it may wellhave arisen swiftly in contemplation of that danger, and it may take place in a hurried andcompletely unsupervisable setting.The fourth setting accordingly presents a unique and excruciating constitutional dilemma. The temporal and spatial likelihood of grave physical danger, the absence of a service member’schoice of particular faith affiliation on the part of the chaplain, and the lack of formal supervisioncumulatively present a significant risk of unwanted religious persuasion in this context.  At thesame time, however, some service members in this situation may experience a longing, howeverarticulated, for explicit, detailed religious inspiration and support.  Faced with this dilemma, amilitary that imposed an outright ban on religious persuasion by chaplains in this setting would
104
protect vulnerable service members from exploitation while simultaneously undermining thereligious options of service members seeking deep and sustained religious counsel at a momentof personal truth.In light of the constitutional sensitivities at either pole of this problem, it is bothremarkable and disquieting that the armed forces currently provides no meaningful guidance tochaplains on how to respond in this context of pastoral care.  A chaplain in a deployed settingwould violate no current military chaplaincy regulations by offering aggressive religious counsel,including explicit efforts at conversion or inculcation of particular religious views, to troops who sought pastoral care, even though such proselytizing is clearly prohibited by the standards of CPEpractice, and seems to be a condition of the constitutionality of healthcare chaplaincy programs.The military’s failure to adopt guidelines for pastoral care is understandable in politicalterms, given the turmoil occasioned by the services’ promulgation of rules governing sectarianprayer at military ceremonies.  Some chaplains’ endorsing organizations and political groups,arguing that proselytizing is an essential part of their religious ministry, would inevitably attack any rule that prohibited or limited chaplains from using aggressive religious persuasion in thesesituations.  But the strategy of avoidance in this context is not constitutionally defensible.  In contrastto ceremonial prayer, which always occurs in the openness of public gatherings, the practice ofpastoral care takes place in private, and often in situations of great emotional and spiritualdistress.  That distress renders those who seek pastoral care vulnerable to undue influence oreven exploitation.In such circumstances, the issuance of constitutionally appropriate guidelines would be
345 In Katcoff v. Marsh, the court accepts and relies on the military’s representation thatproselytizing is prohibited, though such a prohibition is not clearly reflected in any militaryregulation. *9. 105
salutary.  A set of adequate guidelines would explicitly recognize the dilemma presented bypastoral care on the battlefield, and recognize as well the inevitably interactive quality of pastoralcounseling in that setting.  A service member seeking a bit of religious guidance may end upgetting far more than he bargained for, while others may be ill-served by a chaplain’s reticence tofully engage the religious dimensions of the moment.   Pastoral care by military chaplains isjustified as a religious accommodation for the needs of service members, but the administrationof that practice must be responsive to those needs – including needs borne of their particularvulnerability in the very settings that call for the existence of the chaplaincy.  At the very least,the military should prohibit pro-active, chaplain-initiated religious persuasion by chaplains in anycontext in which service members might be regarded as both vulnerable and deprived ofadequate choice of religious confidant.345  As in the CPE model of pastoral care, the structure ofaccommodation demands a carefully calibrated degree of reticence on the part of chaplains. They may share their own faith if invited by the service member, but pastoral care should not beseen as an opportunity to evangelize.  Pastoral care, like other aspects of the military chaplaincy,exists for the purpose of serving the religious needs of service members, as those needs areexpressed by the service members themselves.   Guidelines and training for pastoral care at the frontier of danger should thus explicitlypoint chaplains and their supervisors in the direction of sensitive appraisal of a service member’sreligious background and self-articulated spiritual needs.  Under such a regime, which neitherbanned nor explicitly invited religious persuasion, service members would be neither deprived of
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desired religious support nor exploited at a moment of maximum physical and spiritualvulnerability.  Instead, chaplains would be instructed to put the religious needs and desires ofservice members, rather than the chaplain’s own view of the path to salvation, at the forefront ofthe mission of pastoral care.  As we see it, this is a generic norm in the context of pastoral care,but it has acute and special force on the battlefield. ConclusionAt the outset of this paper, we suggested that the multiplicity of Establishment Clausetests and standards had led many courts and commentators astray in their approach to the militarychaplaincy.  As time and circumstances have repeatedly revealed, the law of the EstablishmentClause cannot be boiled down to a single test or standard.  Instead, the Supreme Court’sdecisions in the field cluster around a set of such tests or standards, each appropriate to its ownparticular context.The military chaplaincy can best be appraised through the legal prism of permissiveaccommodation.  When the institution is so viewed, its basic features appear to fit comfortably within our constitutional tradition.  Various aspects of the institution, however, require close andcareful consideration of a variety of constitutional and statutory concerns.  These concerns do notalways point in the same direction.  We remain convinced, however, that both the overarchingand particularistic evaluation of the chaplaincy can be accomplished effectively only within theframework of permissive accommodation of religion, and with the regard for military judgmentthat follows from application of that framework.
